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I. INTRODUCTION
  Amongst  the many administrative aspects  that  the introduction  of  the Common 
Consolidated Corporate  Tax Base (CCCTB)1 would involve,  the regulation of  tax 
audits  is  deemed to  be one of the most  important  for  the functioning of  the new 
regime. In fact,  the CCCTB, while allowing multinational companies to avoid the 
need to comply with many different national regimes (by means of a new attractive 
and simple regime for determining the taxable base),  and to remove the remaining tax 
obstacles  to  cross-border  business  within  the  Community,  thanks  mainly  to  the 
consolidation, should not compromise the financial interests of Member States, i.e. 
should not become the vehicle for tax evasion or avoidance practices. In reconciling 
these two objectives of the new legislation, the shaping of the tax audits regime would 
have a key role to play. The present work, which focuses mostly on multinational 
groups eligible to consolidation (due to their being the main intended beneficiaries of 
the new regime), assumes as a starting points some questions and choices of general 
character that have been indicated during the work of the CCCTBWG, and aims at 
proposing the key features, from the substantive and procedural viewpoints, of a tax 
audits regime that would be inspired by both objectives which should guide the new 
Directive: “competitiveness” (from the viewpoint of simplicity too) of the CCCTB 
regime  on  the  one  hand,  safeguard  of  the  financial  interests  of  Member  States 
(together with the necessity of proper functioning of the internal market) on the other . 
II. THE KEY ISSUES: THE STATE OF WORK (SUMMARY)
   The  CCCTB  WG,  in  its  2006  working  document,  “administrative  and  legal 
framework/questionnaire”2,  listed  several  issues  related  to  the  common base  audit 
arrangements: the period of time covered by a tax audit; the decision about which 
service should be allowed to check the accounts of which company; the initiative of 
tax accounts auditing; the timing and modalities of the tax auditing; the consequences 
of a tax account audit. On each of these issues, the Commission services suggested 
several points for discussion that, on the whole, cover all the choices to be made in 
shaping the tax audit arrangements related to the CCCTB: a) whether Member States 
rules  providing  limitations  in  time  as  regards  the  tax  years  potentially  subject  to 
auditing should be harmonised; b) whether national tax administrations should only 
be able to check the tax accounts of the companies applying the CCCTB who are 
located in their country, and whether the 1977 directive on mutual assistance provides 
a  sufficient  legal  framework  for  the  necessary  exchange  of  information  between 
national tax administrations; c) whether only the tax administration of the country of 
location  should  be  entitled  to  decide  that  a  company’s  tax  accounts  have  to  be 
1 In  pursuance  of  the  strategy,  which  the  Commission  established  in  2001  (COM(2001)582  of 
23/10/2001, Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles – A strategy for providing companies 
with  a  consolidated  corporate  tax  base  for  their  EU-wide  activities)  and  confirmed  in  2003 
(COM(2003)726 of 24/11/2003,  An internal market without company tax obstacles: achievements, 
ongoing  initiatives  and  remaining  challenges),  to  allow businesses  with  subsidiaries  and  branches 
throughout the European Community to determine their taxable base according to an EU set of rules 
allowing them the EU-wide consolidation of profits and losses. 
2 European  Commission,  2  March  2006,  CCCTB\WP\030\doc\en,  Administrative  and  legal 
framework/questionnaire, pp 5-7 (this working paper, as well as all others subsequently cited in this 
work,  is  available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.htm)
checked,  or  whether the tax administrations of other  Member States in which the 
group entities are located should be involved in the decision or be able to request from 
the host state to check the accounts of  the company at issue; d) whether the CCCTB 
legislation  should  limit  the  duration  of  the  auditing,  and  whether  the  auditing 
procedure should be harmonised or should rely on national rules; e) whether, in the 
event of an increase in the tax base of a company, belonging to a group applying the 
CCCTB, which increases the share of the other MS involved in the overall tax base 
sharing, these Member States should be involved in the decision-making process, i.e. 
in the adjustment of the initial  tax base increase. These points were, only in part, 
addressed  in  a  subsequent  working  document,  “Points  for  discussion  on 
‘Administrative and Legal Framework”3, which highlighted the need for clarity about 
who conducts a tax audit and how the respective administrations collaborate during 
the audit, the desirability of common solutions concerning the commencement of an 
audit, the possibility of relying on existing national rules as regards the procedural 
aspect  (how the  competent  authority  actually  proceeds)  and  the  desirability  of  a 
common approach to some elements of the audit procedure, e.g., a common maximum 
length of the audit or a common statute of limitation.  This working document was 
regarded, by the UNICE Task Force on CCCTB, as a good start to the introduction of 
the  topic,  but  “too  much  focused  on  current  practices  and  not  enough  on  how 
administration in a new and truly competitive system should look like”4. The UNICE 
Task  Force,  in  particular,  emphasized  that,  because  one  of  the  most  fundamental 
benefits  of  a  CCCTB  is  to  reduce  the  compliance  costs  of  having  to  deal  with 
different national systems monitored by different national tax authorities, the CCCTB 
must, in addition to a single set of rules, allow for a single compliance in a single 
location, i.e. a one-stop-shop approach5. This would imply that one tax return in one 
country for the entire group has to be filed, and that the one-stop-shop authority is 
solely responsible for the tax audit of the group. The UNICE recognised that the one-
stop-shop authority, specifically the tax administration of the State of location of the 
parent company, will sometimes be unable to carry out the audits in other Member 
States, and that it would need to ask the local authorities to support it in the execution 
of the tasks at hand, but stressed that the crucial point is to allow the taxpayer to only 
have to interact with one tax administration6. Thus, from the procedural viewpoint, the 
ways of structuring the interaction between the one-stop-shop tax authority and the 
local authorities that could be considered, which were not indicated in the UNICE 
Task Force document, would constitute the key aspects. 
  The one-stop-shop approach was also indicated as the ideal one in the last 2006 
working  document,  “Progress  to  date  and  future  plans  for  the  CCCTB”7,  which 
indicated that Member States would exchange the information to perform checks and 
audit on the basis of the existing mutual assistance directive and recovery directive, 
possibly enhanced to improve their functioning for CCCTB purposes, but recognised 
the need for further work to explore how this would be possible8. This document also 
3 European  Commission,  19  May  2006,  CCCTB\WP\036\doc\en,  Points  for  discussion  on 
‘Administrative and Legal Framework’, 19 May 2006, p. 7
4 Comments on document CCCTB\WP\036 Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working 
Group – Points for discussion on ‘Administration and Legal Framework’ – p. 1
5 Ibid
6 Ibid, p. 2.
7 European Commission, 20 November 2006,  CCCTB\WP\046\doc\en, Progress to date and future 
plans for the CCCTB. 
8 Ibid, p. 16 
highlighted the different views still existing between Member States more favourable 
to a centralised management of the CCCTB, including a single audit mechanism, and 
other  Member  States  in  favour  of  a  decentralised  management  of  the  system, 
according to which administrative aspects such as tax declarations, tax audits and the 
issue  of  explicative  circulars  on  the  CCCTB legislation  would  remain  within  the 
competence of individual Member States9. After setting out, in a working document 
intended to indicate a technical outline, the proposed choices concerning the basic 
structure of the CCCTB, the tax base of individual companies, the consolidation etc,10 
the latest  and related document, “CCCTB: possible elements of the administrative 
framework”, which followed the one-stop-shop approach, specified the key concepts 
to  be applied in  the shaping of  the new administrative  framework.  These  are  the 
concepts of “principal taxpayer” – which would be the ultimate parent company of the 
group – of “competent tax authority” – which would be the authority designated by a 
Member State  for  the  purpose  of  the Directive  introducing  the  CCCTB – and of 
“principal tax authority”, which would in principle mean the competent tax authority 
of the Member State in which the principal taxpayer is resident11.  In addition, the 
document defines the “audit” as any activity conducted by a competent tax authority 
to  verify  compliance  with  the  Directive  by a  taxpayer  or  group of  taxpayers12,  it 
restates the need for a common time limit for finalising tax audits13 and mentions a 
“jointly determined audit approach, which for obvious reasons of practicality, would 
be partly carried out by local tax administrations”14.   
     Amongst all points highlighted in the working papers, the most recent discussion 
on tax audits, at the Conference “CCCTB: the possible contents of Community Law 
provisions”15, seemed to show wide consensus on the fact that as a general rule the 
principal tax authority should take the tax audits initiative, and that the tax authorities 
of the countries concerned show work together as members of an “auditing team” of 
which the principal tax authority should be “the captain”16.   
    In  addition to  the discussions  on the  administrative and legal  framework,  the 
discussions  on the substantive rules  which would govern the  CCCTB, and which 
would impact on the choices to be made in designing the tax audit regime, seem to 
have reached consensus on fundamental issues such as the definition of residency and 
permanent establishment (PE), and the main principle for taxation of residents. On the 
first aspect, companies will remain resident of a particular Member State, although 
there was agreement on the fact that having common criteria for tax residence in the 
CCCTB legislation would ensure a broad and common definition of tax residence at 
9 Ibid, p. 17. 
10 European Commission, 26 July 2007, CCCTB/WP057\doc\en, CCCTB: possibile elements of a 
technical outline.
11 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 7-8. 
12 Ibid, p. 8
13 Ibid, p. 2
14 Ibid, p. 3
15 Co-organised in Vienna on 21-23 February 2008 by  the Institute for Austrian and International Tax 
Law of the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration and the European 
Commission (hereinafter: the Conference). 
16 Definition which were used by Paul Farmer (Dorsey&Whitney, London), discussant at the session of 
the Conference devoted to administrative issues including tax audits, and by Prof. Pasquale Pistone 
(Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration), chairman of such session, to indicate 
the integrated approach to tax audits that is regarded as necessary.    
national levels. The definition of PE, and the attribution of profit to it, would make 
use of the work carried out in the framework of the OECD, complemented by more 
detailed  guidelines  to  avoid  diverging  interpretations  of  the  OECD Principles.  As 
regards  the  main  principle  for  taxation,  the  choice  would  be  for  the  world-wide 
taxation principle, but much of the income from third countries would be exempt.       
   In light of this overall state of progress in the discussion, critical issues emerge as 
regards the shape of the tax audits regime.
III.  THE  SCOPE  OF  THE  TAX  AUDITS  CONCERNING  THE  CCCTB 
REGIME     
  As recalled above, the latest working document specifies that for the purposes of the 
CCCTB regime audit  would  mean “any activity  such  as  enquiries,  inspections  or 
examinations conducted by a competent tax authority  to verify compliance with the  
Directive by a taxpayer or group of taxpayers”17. It also specifies that each taxpayer 
would be required to keep records and supporting documents in sufficient details to 
ensure the proper application of the Directive and to allow audit by the competent tax 
authorities18, and that tax returns would in any event include, among other, details of 
the calculation of the tax base19.  If all  this is considered together with the choice, 
indicated in the previous working document, whereby the new Directive introducing 
the CCCTB would define the tax base but  not  the methodology for adjusting the 
individual company accounts to arrive at the tax base20, it appears to suggest that the 
Directive and its implementing measures would require the taxpayer to indicate in the 
tax returns which adjustments have been made to calculate the common tax base by 
moving from the company accounts, but  would not prescribe the adjustments to be  
made. These latter would be indicated by national laws, and, in consequence, the tax 
audits  aimed at  verifying that  these adjustments  have  been  made correctly  would 
verify compliance with national provisions.  
  From this,  there  would  be  implications  as  regards  the  scope  of  the  tax  audits 
governed by the Directive, the distinction between these and the pre-existing national 
tax audits related provisions and the interrelations between the latter and the former. 
The  tax  audits  provisions  of  the  CCCTB  legislation  would  in  fact  provide  for 
enquiries,  inspections  and  examinations  intended  to  verify  whether  the  individual 
items  of  income and  of  deductible  expenses  as  identified  (by  either  the  CCCTB 
Directive or implementing measures under the Comitology procedure) were correctly 
computed  (e.g.,  to  verify  that  no  item included  within  the  list  of  non-deductible 
expense was treated mistakenly by the taxpayer as deductible expense), and would 
also,  in  the  case  of  consolidated  groups,  need  to  verify  that  the  apportionment 
mechanism was properly applied by the taxpayer. This follows from the fact that, as 
the  administration  would  be  based  on  a  system of  self-assessment,  the  principal 
taxpayer of a consolidated group would be responsible for filing a consolidated tax 
return  for  all  members  of  the  group  which  would  report,  together  with  the 
consolidated tax base, the share of this tax base of each company and PE broken down 
between Member States and the tax liability in each State.     
17 Ibid, p. 8
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. 
20 Due to the fact that companies will start from accounts prepared under different national generally 
accepted  accounting  principles:  see  European  Commission,  26  July  2007,  CCCTB/WP057\doc\en, 
CCCTB: possibile elements of a technical outline, p. 5. 
  If  accepting that the methodology for adjusting individual  company accounts to 
arrive at the tax base would not be indicated by the Directive, this methodology would 
remain within the ambit  of national laws.  Accordingly,  national  provisions on tax 
audits would need to cover the control of whether the methodology for adjusting the 
company accounts (prepared under national general accepted accounting principles) 
to  arrive  at  the  tax  base21 was  correctly  applied  by  each  individual  company (in 
addition to verifying that items of revenues and expenses were properly recorded). It 
was stated that Member States will have to accept that the CCCTB cannot replicate all 
the features of all their existing tax base, and that, in some cases, this will imply a 
different treatment of specific items from the existing national tax bases22. As a result, 
should the CCCTB Directive limit itself to identifying the elements of taxable and 
exempt income, and of deductible and non-deductible expenses, national laws would 
need  to  specify  whether  the  adjustments  to  the  company  accounts  should  first 
determine the national tax base, and subsequently move from the national tax base to 
the  common tax  base,  or  whether  these  adjustments  should  directly  arrive  at  the 
common tax base.  The two alternatives would, in turn, need to be reflected in the tax 
declaration forms.  In the first case, national authorities, when carrying on tax audits 
to verify the correctness of the adjustments to the company accounts for arriving at 
the  common tax  base,  would  have  the  opportunity  of  automatically  verifying  the 
adjustments for arriving at the would-be national tax base too. This would give them, 
as  well  as  the  taxpayers,  the  possibility  of  verifying  immediately  the 
“competitiveness” of the CCCTB provisions in comparison with national provisions. 
   In consequence of the choice of leaving to national provisions the adjustments that 
will be necessary to arrive at the common tax base, the interrelations between the 
verification of the compliance with the CCCTB provisions contained in the Directive 
and the verification of the compliance with national provisions would be in the sense 
that the outcome of the former would need to rely on the latter.  In other words, the 
outcome of the part of the tax audits relating to the new taxable base (and to the 
implementation of the Directive) aimed at verifying whether only exempt income was 
excluded  and whether  only  deductible  expenses  were  deducted  by  the  (principal) 
taxpayer, would reveal that the taxable base according to the new CCCTB rules was 
correctly determined if the methodology for arriving at this tax base, falling within the 
ambit of the verification of the compliance with national provisions (due to the fact 
that the Directive would not deal with this methodology), had been correctly applied. 
In  turn,  the  correct  application  of  this  methodology  does  need  to  rely  on  the 
compliance with national accountancy and tax rules concerning the recording of all 
items of income and expenses, i.e.  on the compliance with all  national provisions 
intended to ensure the proper starting base for the application of the methodology. 
Therefore, a positive outcome23 of all enquiries, inspections and examinations carried 
out under national tax auditing rules remaining outside the envisaged scope of the 
Directive and aiming at  verifying both the application of the methodology on the 
proper starting base and the correctness of this application, would ultimately result in 
a positive outcome of the tax audits falling within the proposed scope of the CCCTB 
Directive, but the opposite would not necessarily hold true. In other words, a tax audit 
21 Which, in most Member States, is based on the adjustments of profit and loss account, whereas in 
other States is based on the balance sheet method. 
22 COM(2007)223  final,  Implementing  the  Community  Programme  for  improved  growth  and 
employment and the enhanced competitiveness of EU businesses: Further Progress during 2006 and 
next steps towards a proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), p. 6.
23I.e., a finding that the methodology was correctly applied to the proper starting base. 
governed by the CCCTB Directive, which, by assumption, were limited to verifying24 
that the calculation of the tax base has been indicated in the tax returns, and that items 
of income and expenses shown by the tax returns fall within the list of taxable income 
and deductible expenses that would be contained or annexed to the CCCTB Directive, 
would  not  be  able  on  its  own  to  check  a  starting  point  (company  accounts  and 
adjustments) which, according to the choice that was regarded as inevitable, would 
fall outside the scope of the Directive and thus outside the scope of the audit itself as 
defined by the Directive (“any activity…conducted by a competent tax authority to 
verify compliance with the Directive..”).    
     This realisation suggests that an audit intended to verify compliance with the 
Directive provisions should always be accompanied by an audit intended to verify 
compliance with all national provisions which, even if left outside the scope of the 
Directive, are inherently linked to the new regime, and part of which (dealing with 
how to arrive at the common tax base) would need to be introduced by Member States 
adhering to the CCCTB by the deadline for implementation of the new Directive. It 
also seems to have important implications for the time limitations in tax audits as well 
as for the hypothesis about the working of the audit arrangements.       
IV. THE TIME LIMITATIONS FOR TAX AUDITS
4. A COMMON NEED FOR DIFFERENT POSSIBLE CASES
Although some of the main benefits of the CCCTB project – such as the ability to 
overcome the need to comply with intra-group transfer pricing rules and to allow loss 
consolidation in a similar way to many internal regimes -  are considered to arise from 
consolidation25,   the Commission’s orientation -  which,  however,  seems to be still 
under discussion - would include within the consolidation only companies which are 
more than 75% owned, while identifying as members of a group for the purposes of 
opting or  not  opting  for  the  CCCTB those  companies  which are  more  than  50% 
owned26. An individual company, whether consolidated or not, who has one or more 
PEs  in  other  Member  States,  would  file  a  consolidated  return  reporting  the 
consolidated tax base, the share of this base of the head office and every PE broken 
down between Member States and the tax liability in each State. From the viewpoint 
of  time limitations  for  tax  audits,  the  need for  a  common time limitation  can  be 
assessed by considering three different situations: a) tax audits for groups which, in all 
Member States where they operate, only have more than 75% owned companies (i.e., 
consolidated companies); b) tax audits in the case of groups which, in all Member 
States concerned, only have more than 50% but less than 75% owned companies (i.e., 
non  consolidated  companies);  c)  tax  audits  in  the  case  of  groups  which,  in  any 
Member State, have both consolidated and non-consolidated companies.      
4.1. Time limitation for audits of groups which have only consolidated companies
24 In addition to the application of the sharing mechanism.
25 European Commission, 26 July 2007, CCCTB/WP057\doc\en, CCCTB: possibile elements of a 
technical outline, p. 21
26 Ibid, p. 4. During the Conference, the usefulness of having two thresholds was actually called into 
question.  
In the case of consolidated companies, a choice not to harmonise the national rules 
providing limitations in time as regards the tax years potentially subject to auditing 
would risk compromising the smooth functioning of the system; it would also give 
rise  to  issues  concerning  the  tax  sovereignty  of  individual  Member  States.  The 
limitations in time set by national rules have the ultimate purpose, from the taxpayers’ 
viewpoint, of providing for legal certainty about which past tax years’ profits or losses 
could be subject to reassessment and, from the tax administrations’ viewpoint, it has 
the  purpose  of  circumscribing  the  auditing  powers.   Assume  a  parent  company 
resident in Member State A, which opt for the CCCTB in year 1, and a subsidiary 
resident  in  Member State  B included in  the consolidation in  year  1,  and that  the 
limitations  in  time  set  by  the  two  Member  States  concerned  are  different.   E.g., 
Member State A allows tax audits up to the tax period closed 3 years previously, 
whereas Member State B up to the tax periods closed 5 years previously. It can be 
supposed that the CCCTB option would be valid for 5 years. Also assume that the 
CCCTB Directive, after defining tax audits as including the activities necessary for 
verifying the compliance with its provisions, leaves to national laws the definition of 
the  methodology  for  arriving  at  the  tax  base.  If  the  Directive  only  established  a 
common time limits for enquiries, inspections and examinations aimed at verifying 
compliance with its provisions which, by choice, would not include the methodology 
for arriving at the tax base, while leaving national laws the definition of time limits 
for audits intended to verify compliance with national provisions which would include 
this methodology,  different time limits set by national laws could jeopardise the legal 
certainty in the context of the new regime and compromise its functioning (and its 
attractiveness) from taxpayers’ viewpoint.   
  E.g.,  the  tax authorities  of  Member State  B carry  on  in  year  5,  under  national 
provisions (by assumption, not affected by the CCCTB Directive), the audit of a tax 
period which is no longer subject to auditing according to the law of Member State A 
– such as, e.g., year 1 - and, as a result of the audit, find out that, for the tax period 
concerned, the methodology for arriving at the common tax base was not properly 
applied, and that the subsidiary resident in its jurisdiction should have declared an 
higher amount of profit before consolidation, which then is adjusted accordingly. 
   In case of introduction of a threshold, below which adjustments to the tax base need 
not be shared27 , no problem would arise if the amount of the adjustment falls within 
this threshold. Nevertheless, this threshold, if introduced, should necessarily consist of 
a  low  amount:  it  could  thus  be  expected  that  the  great  majority  of  adjustments 
deriving from audits would need to be shared amongst all the jurisdictions where the 
group  operates.  In  the  author’s  view,  in  these  cases,  the  tax  authorities  of  other 
Member States concerned, which would be informed about the audit initiative and 
about its final outcome due to the exchange of information in the ambit of the audit 
procedure28, would have a claim arising in this Member State and would need to be 
entitled to require the tax authority who has taken the initiative and carried out the 
audit to provide them with any additional information that may need for the recovery 
of this claim, consistently with Art. 4(1) of  Directive 76/308/EEC29.  
    Assuming therefore that, a result of the audit in Member State B, it is discovered 
that an higher amount of consolidated profit  should have been declared under the 
27 This  possible  choice  was  mentioned  in  European  Commission,  19  May  2006, 
CCCTB\WP\036\doc\en,  Points  for  discussion on ‘Administrative  and Legal  Framework’,  19 May 
2006, p. 6
28 As proposed infra, V, 5.3. and  5.4.
29 The so-called “Recovery Directive”.
CCCTB legislation in the consolidated tax return concerning the tax period at stake, 
and that it would need to be shared, so that (to a greater or less extent depending on 
the  outcomes  of  the  sharing  mechanism),  this  would  be  relevant  for  the  parent 
company resident in Member State  A too,  i.e.  for the principal taxpayer who has 
presented the consolidated tax return to the tax authorities of Member State A. Due to 
the fact that this tax return would thus be not correct, but neither the national laws of 
Member State A  nor  the CCCTB Directive itself could have allowed the principal 
taxpayer to expect a re-assessment for that tax period, it  would seem questionable 
whether the tax authority of Member State A could issue the re-assessment and ask 
for the information for the recovery of what would be its claim: it could be argued that 
the need to offer the principal taxpayers legal certainty in its own jurisdiction would 
prevent the tax authorities of Member State A from issuing the re-assessment, i.e. that 
it would paradoxically require them to accept that, for a past tax year outside the time 
limitation set by national provisions, the share of the consolidated tax base of Member 
State A was under-declared.  Otherwise,  in addition to the issue of (lack of)  legal 
certainty from the principal taxpayer’s viewpoint, the tax revenues of Member State A 
would thus need to depend on the tax audit initiative by tax authorities of Member 
State B as regards tax periods which, under the domestic law of Member State A, 
would no longer be subject to auditing. This would also apply if, after the initiatives 
by tax authorities  in Member State  B,  the subsidiary located there challenged the 
findings  of  their  national  tax  authorities  before  the  competent  courts  in  that 
jurisdiction, because in any case Member State A would have no control on the final 
outcome. Arguably, it may be asserted that Member State A would ultimately gain if 
the final outcome of the audit initiative by tax authorities of Member State B were an 
increase in the overall taxable profit, and thus in its own share of that profit, and that 
in such case it would have an interest in a “mutual recognition” by Member States of 
each  others’  provisions  on  tax  audits,  including  those  concerning  time limitation. 
Nonetheless, the result would be opposite in the case that Member State A allows tax 
audits up to the tax period closed 5 years previously and Member State B does so up 
to the tax period closed 3 years previously, because in this case the tax authorities of 
Member  State  A  would  find  that  the  impossibility  of  co-operation  with  the  tax 
authorities  of  Member  State  B  prevents  them from auditing  a  tax  period,  of  the 
subsidiary located there, whose outcome has affected the overall group profit for one 
of the tax years that the may be auditing in compliance with the legislation of Member 
State A. 
    The differences existing in limitations in time for tax audits would also risk being 
used  by  multinational  groups,  in  their  structuring  strategies,  for  tax-planning 
purposes. It was pointed out that, if some countries are more taxpayers-friendly than 
others, this could trigger a kind of forum-shopping30: the time limitation for tax audits 
is  certainly  one  of  the  factors  that  could  make  one  jurisdiction  appear  more  tax-
friendly  than  another.  Moreover,  the  case-law  of  the  ECJ  indicates  that  forum-
shopping driven location decisions may, when abuse of the freedom of establishment 
is proved, constitute a distortion in the functioning of the internal market31.   
30 European  Commission,  19  May  2006,  CCCTB\WP\036\doc\en,  Points  for  discussion  on 
‘Administrative and Legal Framework’, 19 May 2006, p. 7  
31 And justify limitations to the freedom of establishment: this can be inferred both from the ECJ 
company law rulings (e.g., ECJ 9 March 1999, C-212/97 Centros  [1999] ECR I – 1459, Par 28 and 38; 
ECJ 30 September 2003, C-167/01, Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-10805, Par. 96 and 105) and from the 
ECJ corporate taxation rulings (e.g., ECJ 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppers, [2006] ECR  I- 
7995, Par. 35, 37, 63 and 64). 
   Accordingly, the time limitation for tax audit of consolidated groups should be set 
by the Directive introducing the CCCTB by means of clear and precise provisions, 
such  as  to  have  “direct  effect”  if  not  properly  and/or  timely  implemented32.  In 
addition, to avoid interpretative doubts, tax audits should be defined in the Directive 
as any activity such as verifications, enquiries, inspections or examinations conducted 
by  a  competent  tax  authority  to  verify  compliance  with  the  Directive  and  with 
national  provisions,  such  as  those  specifying  the  methodology  for  arriving  from 
company  accounts  prepared  under  national  GAAP to  the  common tax  base  by  a 
taxpayer or group of taxpayers. Alternatively, if a narrower definition of tax audits in 
the CCCTB Directive were embodied, the common time limit should by set by the 
Directive  not  only  for  the  audits  intended  to  verify  compliance  with  its  own 
provisions, but also for the audits intended to verify compliance with provisions of 
national laws which, even if left outside the new Directive, are essential (such as those 
concerning  the  methodology  of  adjustments)  for  the  correctness  of  the  final 
calculation of the tax base introduced by the Directive: in the author’s  view such 
choice, by its very purpose, would comply with the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles. 
    An issue raised by the setting of a common time limitation for audit concerning 
companies included in a CCCTB group could be, from the viewpoint of individual 
Member States, whether it would be acceptable to have one time limit (e.g., up to the 
tax period closed 4 years previously) for companies included in a CCCTB group, and 
another time limit (e.g., up to the tax period closed 5 years previously), which could 
be the one already set by pre-existing national laws, for companies which are not part 
of such groups. In particular, if the time limit applicable to companies opting for and 
included  in  the  CCCTB  were  more  favourable  than  the  time  limit  applying  for 
companies outside the scope of the CCCTB, and, of course, if the CCCTB were only 
made available to multinational groups, the question could be whether this difference 
in treatment might constitute a sort of “discrimination” towards domestic companies. 
The response does not appear to be suggested by EC law, at least if the difference in 
the time limitations for tax audits is taken alone, because this difference could not, or 
not necessarily, create an economic benefit for companies falling within the CCCTB 
and could thus  not fall  within the definition of  State  aids33.  Arguably,  should the 
CCCTB be limited to multinational groups,  it  would be for national legislators to 
decide whether to align the time limitations concerning audits applicable to domestic 
companies  who  are  ineligible  for  the  CCCTB  to  those  applicable  to  CCCTB 
companies.       
    The indication, by the Directive, of a common time limit for tax audits would avoid 
the  above  mentioned  issues  in  the  cases  of  consolidated  parent  companies  and 
subsidiaries  all  located  within  the  EC  and  which  receive  no  income  from  third 
countries.  However,  if  a member of the consolidated group receives income from 
third countries, this income, according to the world-wide taxation principle, could be 
included  in  the  CCCTB  and  shared  according  to  the  apportionment  mechanism; 
specifically,  according  to  the  intentions,  much  of  the  foreign  income  would  be 
exempt34,  but  any  part  of  it  consisting  of  portfolio  dividends and passive  income 
(royalties, patent income, and interest), as well as income from PEs and income from 
32 As specified by the well settled ECJ case-law: Craig, De Burca, EU Law, Texts, Cases and Material, 
(2008), p. 279-282.
33 The question has been notoriously raised, as a matter of debate, with regard to the CCCTB regulation 
on its whole.
34 European Commission, 26 July 2007, CCCTB/WP057\doc\en, CCCTB: possibile elements of a 
technical outline, p. 30.
major  shareholdings  should  the  corporate  tax  rate  in  the  source  country  be  low, 
would be included and accompanied by a  tax credit  for  the tax paid in  the  third 
country. In consequence, a difference in the time limitations for tax audits between 
the sources countries and the EC countries involved would create an issue of legal 
certainty in case the time limit set by third countries covered a longer period than the 
one set  by the CCCTB Directive (e.g.,  time up to 5 years previously in the third 
country/ies concerned, time limit up to 3 years previously set by the Directive within 
the  Community),  and  the  tax  authorities  of  third  countries  carried  out  an  audit 
concerning a tax period which would be excluded from auditing under the Directive 
and which resulted in a reassessment of the income for that tax period.  The issue 
would be, arguably, whether the share of the tax base of the EC countries concerned 
may be made dependent, for a tax period no longer subject to audit according to their 
national legislations, on the tax audit initiatives of the authorities of third countries 
concerned.  Nonetheless,  a  similar  issue  would  also  exist  from  third  countries’ 
viewpoint,  because in the case of a group with the parent company resident outside 
the  EC  and  more  subsidiaries  resident  in  different  EC  Member  States  these 
subsidiaries could constitute a consolidated group35, and the common time limit for 
tax audits on these subsidiaries set by the CCCTB regime may be different from the 
time limit set by the third country of residence of the parent company (so that either 
the tax authority of the third country could find it impossible to include in the scope of 
its audit for a given tax year that part of income of this parent company deriving from 
the  EC-subsidiaries  if  the  tax  year  at  issue  can  no  longer  be  subject  to  auditing 
according to the time limitation set by the CCCTB legislation, i.e. if this latter sets a 
shorter time limitation, or the third country would have to decide whether to accept 
that its revenues may depend of the tax audit initiative of any Member State adhering 
to the CCCTB in the opposite case).    
    It was noted above that, when this issue arises amongst EC Member States, the 
response could depend on the desirability of a “mutual recognition principle” or of a 
choice of harmonisation, alternatives which would need to be assessed in light of the 
need to  achieve  the  Treaty’s  goals  in  terms of  proper  functioning of  the  internal 
market, and of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles.  
    In the relations between EC Member States and third countries, there is a perceived 
need to avoid the differences of treatment that agreements at bilateral level between 
each individual Member State and each third country could otherwise generate36, and 
which could trigger forum-shopping phenomenon by multinational groups who intend 
to opt for the CCCTB.  For this purpose, two solutions could be envisaged for the two 
potential scenarios. 
     Should all Member States adhere to the CCCTB, the EC should ideally negotiate 
an agreement with any third countries. This solution, while consistent with the (long-
term)  prospect  of  the  EC  negotiating  tax  treaties  with  third  countries  instead  of 
Member States37, would not affect bilateral tax treaties (DTCs) concluded by Member 
States with third countries beyond the extent to which these DTCs are already, as it 
35 Ibid, p. 22 et seq.
36 E.g., the International Chamber of Commerce, in its policy statement “An optional Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in Europe: implications for business worldwide”, states that “As a 
long-term goal, common tax treaties with outside countries should be negotiated from a single location 
and then applied uniformly in CCCTB countries”, p. 3.
37 Which prospect was presented, in the Workshop of Experts on “EC Law and Tax Treaties” held in 
Brussels on 5th July 2005,  as one of the alternatives for relations with non Member States: Lang, EC 
Law and Tax Treaties: possible solutions (presentation), p. 5.  
was highlighted, affected by EC law38, given the specific scope of the agreements at 
stake. These agreements should indicate which components of income derived from 
subsidiaries  or  PEs  located  in  third  countries  would  fall  within  the  CCCTB (and 
would need to be indicated by the principal taxpayer in the consolidated tax return, 
together with the related tax credit) and, vice-versa, which components of income 
remitted by the EC subsidiaries to the extra-EC parent would enter into the taxable 
income of this latter. Moreover, as a feasible strategy at least for the short time, they 
could expressly provide  for  a  “mutual  recognition”,  as  between the EC and third 
countries, of the time limitations set for tax audits by the CCTB legislation and by the 
legislation of any third country: thus, if the time limitation for tax audits set by the 
CCCTB legislation is shorter than the one set by the third country concerned, EC 
countries would have to accept the outcomes resulting from the initiative of the third 
country’s  authority  which  could  affect  tax  years  no  longer  subject  to  auditing 
according  to  the  CCCTB  Directive,  and  vice  versa.  These  agreements  could, 
moreover, provide for a regular exchange of information specifically concerning the 
start and the outcome of tax audits initiatives undertaken by the authorities of both 
contracting  third  countries  and  Member  States,  which  provision  would  be  more 
capable of ensuring the exchange of this information than the exchange of information 
provisions  already  contained  in  the  DTCs39.  Lastly,  they  could  set  out  a  time 
framework for the alignment, at least over the medium run, of the time limit for tax 
audits (which, ultimately, would be in the common interest). 
    Should only a group of Member States adhere to the CCCTB, i.e.  should the 
CCCTB  be  introduced  through  “enhanced  cooperation”,  the  agreement  could  be 
entered into between each participating Member State and each third country, as well 
as  between  each  participating  Member  State  and  each  non-participating  Member 
State: the participating Member States could agree amongst themselves, at political 
level, to negotiate for the same provisions in their individual agreements with both 
non  participating  Member  States  and  third  countries  (which  would  lead  to  a 
coordination, amongst participating States, in the relations with other States). 
4.2. Time limits for tax audits of non-consolidated companies
   In the case of groups which have only non-consolidated companies, the situation of 
individual companies which are considered to be members of the group would not 
seem to be different from the current one with regard to some key aspects: due to the 
lack of consolidation, transfer pricing rules would still need to apply for intra-group 
transactions, and cross-border loss compensation would only be admissible within the 
limits identified by the ECJ case-law  40.  The differences would lie,  except for the 
determination of the tax base according to the uniform rules laid down by the new 
38 European Commission, EC Law and Tax Treaties, working document, 9 June 2005 (Ref.: TAXUD 
E1/FR DOC (05) 2306) for the Workshop of Experts on 5 July 2005, p. 7-8. 
39  Which latter provisions, generally based  on the OECD Model, remain open to the interpretative 
issues highlighted by the literature: inter alia, Van Brunschot, The Judiciary and the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and its Commentaries, Bulletin-Tax Treaty Monitor 2005, p. 5, with regard to the OECD 
Model and Commentaries, concludes that “It is an art in itself to interpret these sources. Such an 
interpretation is, however, necessary before it can be used to help interpret actual treaties”  (p. 11); also 
Pijl, The OECD Commentary as a Source of International Law and the Role of the Judiciary, European 
Taxation 2006, p. 216 (p. 218, p. 224).      
40 Which, with the Marks & Spencer ruling (ECJ 13 December 2005, C-446/03, Marks & Spencer  
[2005]  ECR I-10837, Para.  34, 39 to 51 and 55), has opened various issues: Lang, The Marks & 
Spencer Case-The Open Issues Following the ECJ’s Final Word, European Taxation 2006, p. 54 (p. 
66- 67). 
Directive, in the appointment of a principal taxpayer which would be responsible for 
giving to its tax authority the notice to opt and the annual information on the structure 
of the group41. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to establish the obligation, for 
this tax authority,  to inform the tax authorities  of other Member States concerned 
about the option for the rules of the common tax base. 
   As each non-consolidated company would be responsible for filing its own tax 
return to its national authorities42, the “one stop shop” approach would not apply to 
non-consolidated groups.   Different time limitations for tax audits, set by national 
legislations, would not seem to cause additional issues, but would only perpetuate the 
current situation as regards the independent conduct of tax audits by each national tax 
authority.  The  major  issue,  of  general  character,  would  be  to  what  extent  the 
determination  of  a  tax  base  according  to  new  uniform  provisions,  but  without 
consolidation, would suffice to make the option for this new tax base convenient from 
taxpayers’ viewpoint43: this question would be particularly relevant in cases where the 
new uniform tax bases would lead to a broadening of the tax base in comparison with 
national  rules  and  the  level  of  taxation  were  not  maintained  unaltered  by  the 
introduction of a reduced tax rate for companies opting for the new tax base.     
4.3. Time limitations in tax audits for groups which have both consolidated and non-
consolidated companies. 
  Consolidation,  and  the  sharing  of  the  consolidated  tax  base,  would  take  place 
between an  individual  company of  a  Member  State  and  its  PEs,  if  any,  in  other 
Member States. Situations could thus exist where a multinational group includes both 
companies which would be ineligible for consolidation and companies which have 
PEs in other Member States, in respect of which the consolidation would operate (or 
where the group includes both companies owned by more than 75% and included in 
the consolidation, and companies not eligible for consolidation). 
   In these cases, the need for legal certainty and the obstacles to the functioning of the 
system, evidenced in 4.1.,  which would be created by different time limits set  by 
national  laws for audits  intended to verify the adjustments prescribed by Member 
States to arrive at  the common tax base would apply only to a part  of the group 
concerned, i.e. the parent company/principal taxpayers and consolidated companies. 
Nonetheless, it appears reasonable to predict that a uniform time limit for tax audits of 
consolidated companies coupled with still different time limits for tax audits of non 
consolidated companies would cause difficulties to national tax administrations, and 
that this would apply not only in the cases involving different jurisdictions as argued 
in  4.1.,  but  also  within  any  individual  jurisdiction  in  which  there  could  be  both 
consolidated companies, or consolidated PEs, and non-consolidated companies of the 
same  group,  which  could  make  transactions  with  each  others.  Whilst  these 
transactions  between  consolidated  entities  and  non-consolidated  companies  of  the 
same group within a jurisdiction would affect the taxable profit of both parties, any 
difference in time limitations for tax audits concerning them, by making it possible 
tax  audits  of  only  one  party,  could  prevent  effective  inspections  and  cross- 
investigations of operations that may need to be verified on both concerned parties.
41 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 7
42 Ibid, p. 6.
43 The Commission, in its Communication 2006/157, p. 7, recognised that “it is difficult to identify 
many advantages from introducing a ‘common’ base to operate independently in each Member State..” 
   The common time limit would thus appear to be necessary for tax audits covering 
both consolidated entities and non consolidated companies.       
4.4. Overall observation
   Conclusively, if globally considered, the issues of the scope of tax audits, and of 
time limitations, seem to require a precise definition of the audit coverage (to include 
the verification of the compliance with all substantive provisions, whether introduced 
by Directive or left to national laws, which the taxpayer should observe to arrive at 
the correct determination of the new tax base) and a uniform time limit, for all groups 
which may be eligible to opt for the new tax base. Though different time limits might 
be  seen  as  simply  a  continuation  of  the  current  situation  in  the  case  of  non-
consolidated  groups,  the  fact  that  most  taxpayers  opting  for  the  CCCTB  can  be 
expected to be groups eligible for consolidation (or companies with PEs), and that in 
any Member States there will be likely to be both consolidated and non-consolidated 
entities, leads to this conclusion. A further element suggesting this approach is the 
uncertainty  that,  otherwise,  could  arise  in  situations  of  companies  which  were 
previously  ineligible  for  consolidation  and  which  become  eligible,  and/or  of 
companies  which  are  eligible  and  which,  due  to  a  lowering  of  the  participation 
threshold,  would  become  ineligible  for  consolidation  while  still  eligible  to  the 
common tax base (e.g., taking into consideration 5 tax years, the case of existence of a 
3 years time limits for consolidated companies and of 5 years time limit for non-
consolidated companies, and the case of a company who is consolidated only in year 
3, the doubt could be whether the decisive element, in establishing whether a past tax 
year – such as year 1 or year 2 – could be subject to audit, would be the status of the 
company in the tax year during which the audit is carried out or during the tax period  
to which the audit refers), and the difficulty of establishing a most appropriate rule for 
this purpose.        
V. A HYPOTHESIS FOR SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL TAX AUDITS 
PROVISIONS CONCERNING CONSOLIDATED GROUPS. 
5.  THE  STARTING  POINTS  AND  THE  PROPOSED  SUBSTANTIVE  AND 
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
   The latest working document shows a concern, in the case of consolidated groups, 
to strike a balance between a “one stop shop” approach, which would reduce the 
compliance costs, and a jointly determined audit approach. The principal tax authority 
would have primary responsibility for verification of the consolidated tax returns, and 
for issuing assessments or amended assessments regarding a consolidated tax return 
which would be automatically recognised in the relevant Member State; this authority 
and other competent authorities would jointly decide which additional enquiries and 
inspections are necessary and which authority is to carry them out; the results of any 
such additional  enquiries  and inspections  would be compiled by the principal  tax 
authority, in  agreement with other authorities44.
    If these indications are accepted as a possible starting point, there are key issues 
still  open  for  discussion:  what  would  be  the  content  of  the  verification  of  the 
44 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en,  CCCTB: possibile elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 9.
consolidated tax returns by the principal tax authority; which tax authority should take 
the initiative of deciding that additional enquiries and inspections are necessary and of 
contacting the other tax authorities, and on what grounds. The issue concerning the 
content of the verification of the consolidated tax returns by the principal tax authority 
would depend, in turn, on which kinds of supporting documents would be directly 
available  to  this  authority  and  stored  in  the  central  data  base  mentioned  by  the 
working  document.  For  this  purpose,  it  may  be  proposed  that  the  supporting 
documents would in any case include the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, 
i.e. both the consolidated accounts of the group and of annual accounts of individual 
companies  included  in  the  consolidated  group  (which  accounts,  under  national 
company laws of Member States, must already be filed in general with a commercial 
registry within a certain time from the closing of the accounting year), but not the 
individual accounting books and/or documents (which would create more burdensome 
administrative fulfilments than those required by national laws). In addition to the 
financial  statements,  in  case  additional  documents  were  requested  by  national 
legislations to show the data which would evidence situations where, according to 
criteria set by national laws, there would be scope for further enquiries, investigations 
and inspections, these additional documents should be forwarded and stored too, as 
subsequently indicated in 5.4.
    In the author’s view, should the supporting documents to be stored in the central 
database consist of the balance sheets, of profit and loss accounts, and of additional 
information required according to any criteria laid down by national provisions to 
identify the taxpayers to be subject to substantive tax audit, there would be no risk of 
transmission  of  “sensible  data”  such  as  commercial,  industrial,  business  and 
professional secrets.  In effect, these secrets (which any company has the interest to 
keep as they contribute to its competitive position in the market) ultimately lie in 
particular know-how or capabilities that contribute to allow the business, whatever its 
sector, to obtain or increase its income by innovating its products or its services: the 
information relevant for tax purposes, while including income and expenses, do not 
extend to these secrets, the safeguard of which (for ensuring the exclusive exploitation 
by the holder)  falls  within the area of  industrial  and intellectual  property law.  In 
addition, the information provided in the descriptive reports which are part  of the 
annual  financial  statements,  while indicating as explanations  of  upwards trends in 
market sales e.g. the launch of new products or services or of innovations to existing 
products  and  services  resulting  in  new patents  or  trademarks,  are  not,  as  known, 
requested  to  include  the  commercial,  industrial,  business  and  professional  secrets 
which lie at the root of any innovation contributing to increases of profit.  This also 
applies to the information to be supplied in accordance with any criteria laid down by 
national provisions to identify the taxpayers to be subjected to substantive tax audit45. 
Consequently, the suggestion that the supporting documents to be stored in the central 
database  consist  of  the  balance  sheets,  of  profit  and  loss  accounts,  and  of  any 
additional  information  required  according  to  the  criteria  laid  down  by  national 
45 Which information usually includes mere economic and financial details or may include other details 
(e.g., number of employees, size of premises) concerning the productive capacity of the taxpayer 
and/or its past behaviour. These kinds of details are needed for the application of methods for risk 
assessment (i.e., for the assessment or the risk of tax evasion) and for the subsequent selections of 
taxpayers to be inspected, such as the “instruments for risk analysis” in France,  the “sector studies” in 
Italy and the “indicative rates” in Germany. For a comparative view of the application of these criteria, 
Scorrano, Le esperienze estere dei sistemi di stima oggettiva e dei relativi metodi di controllo, 
FiscoOggi,  6 August 2004.
provisions to identify the taxpayers to be subject to substantive tax audit, appears to 
be a workable one46.   
    On this assumption, and on the further assumption that the consolidated tax returns 
filed by the principal taxpayer and stored with the supporting documents in the central 
database, when indicating “The calculation of the share of the consolidated base by 
Member State of each taxpayer”, would also indicate the starting points concerning 
the elements of the proposed sharing mechanism (labour, assets, sales)47, a hypothesis 
may be as follows.
5.1. A two phases audit regime
   The verification of the consolidated tax returns by the principal tax authority could 
reasonably  be  intended  as  a  “formal  verification”,  which  would  be  a  first  and 
necessary phase of the tax audits: this verification could be conceived as a formal one 
because the principal authority, through the information given by the consolidated tax 
return (specifically,  through the “details  of  the calculation of  the consolidated tax 
base..” included in the consolidated tax return), would know which calculation have 
been  made  to  arrive  from  individual  tax  bases  before  the  consolidation  to  the 
consolidated  tax  base,  would  have  the  supporting  documents  forwarded  by  the 
principal  taxpayer  available,  and,  due  to  the  details  provided  by  the  principal 
taxpayer, would have the data on labour, assets and sales needed to check whether the 
sharing  mechanisms  has  been  correctly  applied  on  the  bases  of  those  data.  The 
principal tax authority would thus be in a position not only to review the correctness 
of the calculation and to check  whether the items of taxable income and deductible 
expenses indicated in the tax return fall  within the list  contained by the Directive 
and/or  in  an  implementing  measure,  but  also  whether  they  are  indicated  in  the 
company’s  accounts,  and  whether  the  apportionment  formula  has  been  correctly 
applied by assuming as a starting point the data indicated by the principal taxpayer. It 
would  seem  that,  up  to  this  point,  the  examination  could  be  carried  out  by  the 
principal tax authority thanks to the high degree of uniformity of accounting practices 
(universally adopting the double entry bookkeeping technique)   from one country to 
another, which makes it easy to recognise, in profits and loss accounts of companies 
located e.g. in three different Member States, which kinds of income and of expenses 
have been respectively obtained and sustained by the three companies.  In addition to 
the notorious introduction of the obligation for listed groups to prepare their financial 
statements  according  to  the  international  accounting  standards48,  the  accounting 
directives previously introduced by the EC as part of the company law harmonisation 
program, i.e. the Fourth49 and the Seventh company law Directives50, despite a wide 
number of options left to Member States as regards their implementation in national 
laws, have contributed to facilitating the “reading” of balance sheets and of profits 
and loss accounts also of unlisted companies located in a Member State by interested 
parties in other Member States. This contributes to make it easier a formal check on 
the  types  of  income  obtained  and  of  expenses  incurred  by  individual  companies 
46 The filing of both tax returns and all supporting documents could well take place electronically rather 
than in hard copies. 
47 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en,  possibile elements of  the 
sharing mechanisms, 13 November 2007, p. 7-15
48 Regulation 1606/2002/EC of 19 July 2002, OJEC L 243/1 [2002], as subsequently integrated. 
49 Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978, OJEC L 222/11 [1978], as subsequently amended.
50 Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983, OJEC L 193/1 [1983], as subsequently amended.
included  in  the  consolidation  for  the  principal  tax  authority  (with  general  and 
technical language-related assistance when needed). 
   In  national  tax  regimes,  after  a  formal  verification  on  the  tax  returns,  further 
enquiries, investigations and inspections are carried out towards taxpayers identified 
from time  to  time.  To this  end,  there  are  Member  States  which  have  introduced 
methodologies  which  either  determine  a  minimum income,  based  on  the  average 
income of businesses operating in any specific economic sector, which is considered 
as normal51, or consider the past behaviour of the taxpayer and tend to identify what 
would be the normal situation, from the overall economic and financial viewpoint, of 
businesses operating in the economic sector52. In all such cases, the situation shown 
by the individual taxpayer is compared with the “normal situation”, in order to find 
out  whether  his  situation  can  be  regarded  as  presenting  a  risk  of  tax  evasion  or 
avoidance.  While  these  methodologies  are  mainly  applying  to  taxpayers  roughly 
falling within the category of small and medium enterprises, the aspect which in the 
author’s view can be of general interest lies in their underlying philosophy: that of 
maximising  the  possibilities  of  selecting,  for  further  inquiries,  investigations  and 
inspections, taxpayers which are in situations that can be regarded as “anomalous”, 
and where the risk of tax evasion or tax avoidance could be supposed to exist. 
     In  consequence,  to  be attractive for  those eligible  taxpayers  subject  to  these 
national  regimes,  the  new  CCCTB  legislation  should  “borrow”  the  underlying 
philosophy. This choice could be expected, to an even greater extent, to contribute to 
make the new regime attractive even for those eligible companies which are located in 
Member States where no similar methodologies exist, due to the greater degree of 
legal certainty that would in any case be offered about the situations triggering further 
enquiries and inspections after the introduction of the CCCTB: if under their national 
legislations those companies can be subject to further investigations and inspections 
involving access to their premises at any time, the introduction of a CCCTB Directive 
characterised  by  the  philosophy  under  consideration  –  if  combined,  for  an  initial 
period of application of the CCCTB regime, with the mutual recognition of existing 
national practices – can be expected to indicate to these companies that,  although 
inspections involving access to their premises could always take place, these audits 
may occur  in particular if/when they fall within anomalous situations.  The greater 
degree of certainty, for these companies, about when they could be subject to these 
audits would seem to be evident.
    If  accepting that the further  enquiries,  investigation and inspections involving 
access to the company’s premises, which in this work are referred to as “substantive 
tax audits”, should be aimed at detecting cases: 
 a) of tax evasion, i.e. where either a part of the company’s income might have been 
not  recorded  in  the  company  accounts  (i.e.  cases  of  under-invoicing)   and 
subsequently not included in the tax returns or more expenses might have recorded 
than actually sustained by one of the consolidated companies in its jurisdictions; 
b) of tax avoidance, i.e. where attempts would appear to have been made to shift part 
of the taxable profits from one jurisdiction to another; 
c) of combinations of tax evasion and avoidance,.  
51 This is the case of the Italian methodology named “sector studies” (“accertamento in base agli studi 
di settore”), first introduced by decree n. 331/1993 and by Law n. 427/1993  
52 These cases can be found in the French experience of “monographies” and subsequently of electronic 
instruments of risk analysis  and in the German experience of “indicative rates”:  Scorrano, Le 
esperienze estere dei sistemi di stima oggettiva e dei relativi metodi di controllo, FiscoOggi,  6 August 
2004. 
    the question could be whether, to identify the anomalous situations where these 
cases  may  occur,  methodologies  such  as  the  ones  above  mentioned  should  be 
introduced  either  by  the  CCCTB  Directive  or  by  any  subsequent  implementing 
measure,  or  whether  simpler  criteria  should  be  chosen  for  the  same  purpose  of 
selecting the anomalous situations and identifying accordingly the CCCTB taxpayers 
towards whom to carry out substantive tax audits. 
    In other words, a choice would need to be made whether to introduce or not – as 
common  modalities  for  selecting  the  CCCTB  taxpayers  to  be  inspected  - 
methodologies which, for the different economic sectors, identify  common ranges of 
income  of  EC  businesses  and/or  common  ranges  of  percentage  values  of  ratios, 
normally  used  in  the  economic  and  financial  analysis  of  annual  (individual  and 
consolidated) accounts53, for EC business in the different sectors,  in order to compare 
the situations emerging from the consolidated tax returns and accounts filed by the 
principal taxpayer with these ranges of income and/or ranges of percentage values. In 
the author’  s  view,  a  similar  choice,  while  it  would make it  easy to  identify  the 
CCCTB groups (and the individual consolidated units) falling outside the common 
ranges, would need to be viewed not only against the need of a simple administration 
of the system (administration whose costs could certainly be expected to increase due 
to the introduction of these methodologies and to their yearly application), but also 
against  at  least  four  other  factors:  1) the difficulty  of identifying common ranges 
between  a  minimum  and  maximum  income  that  may  be  typical  of  businesses 
throughout the Community, caused by the fact that factors such as the geographical 
location, the vicinity to the markets of reference and the relationships with customers 
can  well  cause,  for  physiological  economic  and  market  reasons,  the  income  of 
individual  businesses  included  in  a  consolidated  CCCTB  group  and  located  in 
different parts of the EC to vary well beyond those ranges, so that ranges of normal 
income  might  turn  out  to  be  more  significant,  for  identifying  truly  anomalous 
situations, when applied at national level; 2) the possibility that the outcomes that 
could be obtained,  with the parameters given by common EC ranges of percentage 
values  of  economic  and  financial  ratios  (which  reflect,  in  turn,  the  company’s 
behaviour from the operational viewpoint), can already or even better be ensured by 
the “mutual  recognition”  of  these  methodologies  as  and  when applied  at  national 
level,  where  the  socio-economic  factors  that  may affect  businesses’  situations,  as 
reflected in those ratios, may generally be more uniform;  3) the further possibility 
that Member States may manage, by spontaneously co-ordinating with each others 
these kinds of methodologies and parameters when applied, to achieve the same result 
that could derive from EC parameters; 4) the realisation that the use or not of these 
parameters, for identifying “anomalous” situations for auditing purposes, is rooted in 
national contexts characterised by different degrees of cooperation between taxpayers 
and tax administrations, and the possibly negative reactions, in terms of interest for 
the CCCTB regime,  of  those  eligible  businesses  located in  Member States  where 
similar methodologies would not be applied and would appear unusual.         
    For these reasons - which, as regards the points 1), 2) and 3) may result, at least for 
the time being and the short term future, in the fact that a proposal to introduce the 
would-be EC methodologies and business parameters above indicated might not meet 
the subsidiarity test – it would seem preferable to defer the hypothesis of introduction 
of these instruments for substantive tax audit purposes to a later phase of the CCCTB 
regime.  In other words, if accepting that (as it seemed to be in the original idea) it 
53 Such as the Return on Equity (ROE), the Return on Investments (ROI), the indicators of the financial 
position etc. 
would  make  sense  to  initially  introduce  the  CCCTB  for  an  experimental  period, 
during which practical experience could be gained and after which various elements, 
amongst which the tax audit regimes, could be revised in the light of this experience, 
the Directive could provide that, after a given number of years (e.g., 5 years), the tax 
audits substantive and procedural provisions could be subject to revision to assess ex 
post their effectiveness in light of practical experience and consider any amendment. 
Should  Member  States  agree,  after  the  initial  phase  (during  which  the  use  of 
methodologies and parameters such as those above considered would be subject of 
mutual recognition when established by any national legislation), that the introduction 
at EC level of these methodologies and parameters for identifying the CCCTB groups 
to  be  audited  satisfies  the  same  needs  as  the  grounds  for  substantive  tax  audits 
already  set  out  in  their  national  laws  and  can  be  more  effective  in  sufficiently 
achieving  this  purpose,  the  introduction  of  the  methodologies  and  parameters 
considered could then become realistic and necessary, as an alternative to the mutual 
recognition and after due consultation with the business sector.  
   For the initial phase of application of the CCCTB regime, the criteria for selecting 
the  taxpayers  towards  whom to  carry  out  substantive  audits,  while  protecting  the 
financial  interests  of any Member State,  should also achieve the objectives  of:  a) 
minimising the risk of being perceived, by taxpayers, as involving a greater possibility 
of  being  subject  to  substantive  tax  audits  than  under  the  national  enquiries  and 
investigations  schemes,  and,  as  previously  mentioned,  provide  them with  greater 
certainty, in order not to discourage (and possibly to encourage) the option for the 
CCCTB regime; b) offering tax authorities of the Member States concerned – whose 
officials should ultimately collaborate as members of an “auditing team”54 - common 
rules that would allow them an effective team working. To this end, in the author’ 
view, it  would be necessary to indicate in the Directive, by means of a provision 
formulated in a clear and precise manner, specific  criteria  which should be simpler 
than  the  methodologies  above  mentioned  and which  would  signal  anomalous 
situations, and on the basis of which CCCTB taxpayers to be inspected should be 
chosen. The purpose of these criteria should be that of allowing tax authorities a “tax 
risk”  assessment  as  effective  as  the  one  deriving  from  the  above  recalled 
methodologies, and a focus of their substantive audits activities (and of the necessary 
resources) on those situations where these activities, by revealing cases of evasion or 
avoidance,  can effectively achieve their ultimate “raison d’etre” .  
     In addition, in light of the  fact that the principal tax authority would be expected 
as a general rule to take the initiative55, and with regard to the need for tax authorities 
to cooperate effectively, a further reason for specifying in the CCTB Directive the 
criteria for selecting the taxpayers for substantive audits purposes can be highlighted 
by considering those cases where the principal taxpayer, the parent company, could be 
located in a jurisdiction with more lenient auditing practices than the jurisdictions of 
location of the subsidiaries56.  In such a situation, if the criteria for selecting taxpayers 
were not indicated in the Directive, but relied entirely on the mutual recognition of 
divergent  national  practices,  the  principal  tax  authority,  by  following  its  own 
practices, may not take the tax audit initiative in situations where the tax authorities of 
the  other  Member  States  concerned  may  wish  it  to  do  so  towards  the  principal 
54 Retro, par. II.   
55 Ibid. 
56 The case was made at the Conference, by Prof. Daniel Garabedian (Universite’ Libre de Bruxelles), 
of parent companies located in Luxembourg.    
taxpayer,  and this  would risk jeopardising the degree of mutual trust  between tax 
authorities and, ultimately, their  “team working” ability.          
    An  objection  that  may  be  submitted,  against  the  choice  of  indicating  in  the 
Directive the criteria to be used for selecting the CCCTB taxpayers towards whom 
substantive tax audits would be carried out, could be that such a choice would prevent 
changes in the revisions of audits plans, i.e. that such a choice would lead to lack of 
flexibility as categories of taxpayers that need to be inspected in the future may be 
different from those categories that may currently need to be inspected. Nevertheless, 
the objection does not appear to be well grounded: the criteria would be specified 
from the objective viewpoint - i.e., from the viewpoint of the situations triggering the 
substantive tax audits – and certainly would not indicate categories of taxpayers. In 
other words, the criteria would not distinguish “good [i.e. normal] taxpayers” from 
“bad [i.e., not normal] taxpayers”, but would rather serve to distinguish “good [i.e., 
normal] situations” from “bad [i.e., not normal] situations”, by identifying the latter as 
reasons for triggering substantive tax audits (in the interest also of an efficient use of 
resources by the tax administrations).  Taxpayers  falling,  at  a  point in  time,  under 
normal situations may no longer fall under the same situations in the future, or vice-
versa,  so  that  the  identification  of  not-normal  situations,  by  means  of  objective 
criteria, would actually help (rather than hinder) the revisions of auditing plans, i.e. 
would  help  adapting  the  auditing  plans  (intended  to  identify  the  taxpayers to  be 
inspected)  to  changeable  needs,  over  time,  for  substantive  tax  audits  of  certain 
taxpayers rather than of other taxpayers.  
     As regards the objective criteria, a suggestion could be to indicate,  in  the CCCTB 
Directive,  that  substantive  tax  audits  (after  the  formal  verification  carried  out 
primarily by the principal tax authorities) may (but, as it will be subsequently argued, 
not necessarily must) be carried out when: 1) one of the companies included in the 
consolidation, for a given number of years prior to the group’s option for the CCCTB 
and for a given number of years (e.g., 3 years) after the inclusion in the consolidated 
group,  continuously  declares  losses  or  decreasing  profits  from  one  tax  years  to 
another, reveals an anomalous situation and reduces every year the consolidated tax 
base and the share of each Member State; 2) there is an error in the calculation of 
Member States shares for 2 or 3 consecutive tax years, as a consequence of which the 
share of a Member State is under-declared, even if by less than 0,5%57, in each of 
these  tax  years  and  the  share  of  another  Member  State  is  correspondingly  over-
declared by the same percentage for the same periods; 3) the principal taxpayer has 
either failed to file the consolidated tax returns or to respond to other enquiries; 4) the 
principal taxpayers has submitted returns which are considered as not reliable due to 
multiple  and  significant  errors  and  inconsistencies  (from  multiple  and  significant 
calculation errors to inconsistencies between the tax returns and the accompanying 
documents).
5.2.  The  proposed  criteria  for  selecting  CCCTB  taxpayers  for  “substantive  tax  
audits” purposes: underlying reasons
The purpose of the possible enquiries, investigations and inspections would be, in 
case 1) above, to detect potential cases of tax evasion, and, in case 2), to find out 
57 Which would be the margin below which no amended assessment would be issued if the error occurs 
(for a single tax year): European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the administrative framework,  p. 11.
potential attempts to shift the taxable base from one State to another, which attempts 
may be suspected to take place when the calculation made by the principal taxpayer 
leads to an under-declaration of the share of the Member State which has the highest 
corporate tax rates (and to an over-declaration of the share of the Member State which 
has the lowest tax rate).  The first situation in case 3) (failure to file the tax returns) 
would follow, as a ground for substantive tax audit, from the overall structure of tax 
audit, in which, as subsequently highlighted, the formal verification, based on the tax 
returns and the accompanying documents, would always be the necessary phase, and 
thus from the fact that, without the tax returns, this phase could not be carried out, and 
the  same would  apply  to  case  4)  (unreliable  tax  returns).  However,  as  it  will  be 
indicated, the substantive tax audit, even in this case, should not automatically take 
place, given that this case would first trigger the issue of an assessment based on an 
estimate58 . As regards the second situation in case 3) (failure to respond to other 
enquiries), the proposal would be to associate it with exceptional circumstances where 
the  time  for  issuing  amended  assessments  could  be  extended,  as  subsequently 
indicated in 5.5.     
   Admittedly, tax evasion could in practice occur also in cases different from the one 
of continuous losses or of continuously decreasing profit declared by a company (case 
1), and tax avoidance attempts could be also made in manners different from under-
declaration of the share of the Member State having the highest tax rate (case 2), 
whereas the failure to file the consolidated tax return or to respond to other enquiries 
(case 3) could either conceal an attempt of tax evasion and/or avoidance or none of 
them (if due only to negligence). However, the first two cases may reasonably be 
supposed – the former when associated with an anomalous situation, the latter when 
occurring  in  more  than  one  year  -   to  indicate  situations  where  tax  evasion  or 
avoidance is more likely than in other situations; in the author’s view, it would thus 
make sense to provide for, in the CCCTB Directive, the possibility of enquiries and 
investigations in these situations. 
   It  could  certainly  be  objected  that,  under  the  ECJ case-law,  the  notion  of  tax 
avoidance  –  as  the  Commissions  has  recalled59 –  is  limited  to  wholly  artificial 
arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the legislation of the Member 
State concerned, and that the ECJ, in identifying the factors that do not of themselves 
suffice to signal abuse, has expressly confirmed inter alia that more favourable (tax) 
provisions can have a role in the decision on where to set up a subsidiary60. It can thus 
be deduced that the goal of minimising the tax burden is in itself a valid, acceptable 
commercial  consideration  as  long  as  the  related  arrangements  do  not  amount  to 
artificial transfers of profits61.  Consequently – the objection may be – if the goal of 
minimising the tax burden is in itself acceptable subject to this condition, an error 
which minimise the tax burden must also be acceptable at least within the same limit. 
Two counter-arguments could however be proposed: first, not the error in itself, but 
its  repetition  over  a  number  of  years,  could  be  seen  as  concealing  an  attempt  to 
achieve the same result as an artificial transfer of profits; second, the provision of this 
possible ground for substantive tax audit would also appear consistent with the fact 
that the ECJ’s findings in Marks & Spencer, when regarding the potential deduction 
of  losses in  the jurisdiction where they could generate  the highest  tax value as  a 
58 See infra, at the end of this subparagraph.
59 Communication COM(2007) 785, the application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct 
taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries, p. 3. 
60 Ibid, and ECJ 12 September 2006, C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppers [2006] ECR I-7995, Par. 37 
61 Communication COM(2007) 785, the application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct 
taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries, p. 3
distortion62,  implicitly suggest that mere tax-savings practices from one jurisdiction 
to another, of which the deduction of losses in the State with the highest tax rate can 
be taken to be only an example to the same extent as an under-calculation of profits 
taxable in this State, fall within the category of artificial transfers of profits or are in 
any case considered to be equivalent to these latter.     
   To sum up, a provision, formulated in clear and precise wording so as to have 
“direct effect”63, authorising tax administrations to carry out “substantive” tax audits 
in these situations should ultimately have three purposes. First, to ensure the taxpayers 
that  no  additional (i.e.,  new)  grounds  for  substantive  tax  audits  other  than  those 
provided for will exist as a result of the choice of opting for the CCCTB regime, and 
thus to  contribute  to  the clarity  of  the  new legislation.  Second,  to  leave  Member 
States, who, predictably, would be reluctant (at least in the short run) to give up their 
national  practices  for  substantive  tax  audits,  free  to  maintain  these  pre-existing 
grounds for  tax audits  and to  mutually  recognise them for  tax audits  purposes of 
consolidated groups under the CCCTB regime. In relation to these first two purposes, 
the combination of the new uniform provision and of the mutual recognition of the 
(pre-existing)  national  practices  can  be  assumed  to  reduce  the  scope  for  forum-
shopping phenomenon that could otherwise be created by a choice lying only in the 
mutual recognition64.  This result, in turn, would reasonably be go beyond what could 
be achieved by the individual Member States and could not be achieved other than 
through uniform provisions, so that the setting out of these grounds for substantive tax 
audits would also comply with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. It can 
be  added  that,  by  reducing  the  scope  for  tax  planning  practices,  the  provision 
establishing  in  the  CCCTB  Directive  the  criteria  for  selecting  the  taxpayers  for 
substantive tax audits purposes  would help making the CCCTB consistent with the 
above recalled case-law, to the extent that the new regime, while allowing, thanks to 
the consolidation, the cross-border offsetting of losses beyond the limits set in the ECJ 
case-law, would at the same time contribute to prevent or at least minimise the risk of 
abusive practices that induced the ECJ to set those limits. Lastly, the new provision 
establishing  these criteria  for  substantive  tax  audits  would give  tax authorities  an 
indication of cases of common interest  for all  concerned Member States that may 
arise  as  regards  the  groups  opting  for  the  CCCTB  regime  and  benefiting  from 
consolidation (and that may not be expected to be established by national legislations, 
particularly  in  the  case  of  under-calculation  as  wrong  application  of  the  sharing 
mechanism); in this respect too, it would thus be beyond the reach of any individual 
Member State and be consistent with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. 
    In addition, a provision setting out these criteria for choosing the CCCTB taxpayers 
for substantive tax audits would be consistent with the perceived need65 to harmonise 
the  auditing  powers  of  tax  authorities  and  could  represent  a  step  towards  the 
introduction of a basic “European taxpayer’s statute”, which would define the rights 
and duties of taxpayers, the limitations of powers of tax authorities and the general 
principles governing the relationships between tax authorities and taxpayers. Amongst 
these principles, there could be scope for an assumption – at least at a general level - 
of correct behaviour on the part of taxpayers as a fundamental principle on which tax 
administrations  operate,  which  principle  is  already  implicitly  set  by  the  OECD 
62 ECJ 13 December 2005, C-446/03, Marks & Spencer [2005]  ECR I-10837, Par. 50
63 As established by the settled ECJ case-law.
64 And would thus be consistent with the purpose which was already indicated as regards a common 
maximum length of the audit and a common statute of limitation: European Commission, 19 May 
2006, CCCTB\WP\036\doc\en, Points for discussion on ‘Administrative and Legal Framework’, p. 7.
65 Which seemed to emerge from the Conference.
taxpayer’s charter66 and suggests that a general practice of carrying out substantive tax 
audits at any time towards the generality of CCCTB taxpayers should not be followed 
by  tax  authorities.  In  other  words,  this  principle,  whether  implicitly  or  expressly 
stated,  suggests  that  specific  criteria  should  exist  for  selecting  the  taxpayers  for 
substantive audit purposes, and that these criteria should aim at targeting situations 
where the general assumption of correct behaviour on the part of the taxpayers may 
not  correspond  to  the  reality  (i.e.  that,  the  higher  the  degree  to  which  taxpayers 
comply  regularly  with  tax  obligations  and  do  not  show  elements  signalling  an 
anomalous situation, the higher the extent to which it would make sense to trust them, 
in accordance with the principle considered). As regards the merit of the suggested 
criteria, the following observations apply. 
     The case of continuous losses for a given number of years (or of continuously 
decreasing profit) by a company could reveal67 an anomalous situation in case the 
losses indicated in the company accounts and in the tax returns were accompanied, 
during all  or  most of the financial  years at  stake,  by cash inflows, i.e.  by a non-
corresponding trend in the amount of financial resources available to the company 
(which can be verified in its bank accounts too). In fact, although according to general 
accounting  practice  (and  to  the  IFRS  Framework)  income  and  expenses  are 
recognised on an accrual basis and not at the moment when cash or its equivalent is 
received or paid, in the medium run a company which declares losses (or continuously 
decreasing profits) one year after another cannot normally be expected to increase its 
financial  resources.  This  situation  would  thus  be  as  effective  as  the  ranges  of 
percentage values of the economic and financial ratios mentioned in 5.1. in signalling 
an anomalous case (and, as a matter of fact, would correspond to a case where the 
economic and financial ratios would show inconsistencies with each others). 
    Should such situation exist, the suspect of tax evasion would thus be justified as a 
base for triggering enquiries and investigations involving, for each of the year of the 
period  taken  into  consideration,  the  company’s  accounting  books,  the  supporting 
documents (invoices issued and received, etc..), its premises and the banks accounts. 
The provision contemplating the case of continuous losses by one of the companies 
included in the CCCTB consolidation as a ground for possible tax audits beyond the 
formal  verification  by  the  principal  tax  authority  should,  however,  establish  an 
exception for new companies operating in particular sectors where losses in the first 
years of activity are normally incurred. Moreover, the burden of proof of tax evasion 
should remain with tax authorities, who could establish a finding of evasion where the 
company is unable to offer any demonstrable (and legally acceptable) justification for 
the situation.  A choice  of  leaving the  burden of  proof  to  tax  authorities,  for  this 
ground  for  tax  enquiries  and  inspections  that  would  be  set  out  by  the  CCCTB 
Directive, appears to be justified in light of the fact that the CCCTB regime – by 
overcoming obstacles such as the lack of a general possibility of cross-border loss 
compensation or the risk of transfer pricing disputes, and by lowering the costs of 
compliance – is ultimately intended to facilitate the freedom of establishment through 
the Community, and in light of the further realisation that, under the ECJ case-law 
concerning direct taxation in cases involving the freedom of establishment and the 
66 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs forum on tax administration, Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations 
– Practice Note. GAP002 (2003), p. 8 “Your tax administration…operates on the fundamental principle 
that… taxpayers will act  in accordance with the law when treated with respect and fairness..” : 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 24/52/17851176.pdf    
67 Irrespective of the fact that the losses incurred by a company before entering a CCCTB group would 
not be taken into account in the consolidation: European Commission, 26 July 2007, 
CCCTB/WP057\doc\en, CCCTB: possibile elements of a technical outline,  p. 26  
interpretation  of  one  of  the  Directives,  namely  the  Merger  Directives,  which  are 
intended  ultimately  to  facilitate  its  exercise,  the  use  of  that  freedom for  abusive 
(including,  by  definition,  tax  evasion)  purposes  can  be  subject  to  neither  general 
presumptions  set  by  national  or  EC  anti-abuse  provisions  nor  to  presumptions 
determined  by  location-related  decisions,  but  must  always  be  proved by  Member 
States68.   
   In turn, the case of under-calculation of the share of a Member State which has 
higher tax rate than other Member States involved, even if by less than 0,5% of the 
tax base for that State, could justify the suspect that the situation is not one of an 
unintentional (good faith) error, but of attempts at shifting the taxable base, if this 
under-calculation takes places for more than one year at  the expense of the same 
State.  It  could  thus  trigger  enquiries  and  inspections  of  the  company’s  books, 
premises and documents, aimed at verifying if what would appear to be an under-
calculation of the share of the Member State at issue (according to the data provided 
by the principal taxpayer in the tax returns and shown in the accompanying balance 
sheets, with accompanying directors’ and auditors’ reports)  actually corresponds to 
the situation of labour, assets and sales (the elements used in the sharing mechanism) 
– in which case the error, which may be unintentional, would be in data provided by 
the taxpayer – or if the actual situation regarding labour, assets and sales leads to an 
higher share of the tax base for the company at stake and thus for its Member State of 
residence.  The choice to  consider,  in  designing the sharing mechanism,  the  place 
where the employees provide their services, and only fixed tangible assets69, would 
make the verification easy. In other words, according to the author a provision of the 
CCCTB Directive setting out, as a possible grounds for “substantive” tax audits, an 
under-calculation of the share of a consolidated company in a Member State, even if 
by less than 0,5%, for more than one year, could serve to clarify that this situation 
could trigger inspections intended to verify the application of the sharing mechanisms 
in itself. Even in this case, the burden of proofs of actual tax avoidance should remain 
with  tax  administrations,  again  for  consistency  with  the  ECJ  case-law,  and  tax 
avoidance could be reasonably assumed to be proved when the taxpayer offers no 
acceptable and rationale justification (different from the error) for the repetition of the 
under-calculation of the tax base share of the Member State concerned.
     The first hypothesis in case 3) above indicated – i.e,  a principal taxpayer who has 
omitted to file the consolidated tax returns by the due date – would, according to the 
choice indicated in the CCCTBWG working document, determine the issue by the 
principal tax authority of an assessment based on an estimate, taking into account 
such information as it is available, and the principal taxpayer could appeal against this 
assessment70.  In  case  of  an  appeal  against  this  estimate,  which  appeal  could  be 
expected to be based on a claim that the assessment has overestimated the profit, the 
principal taxpayer should be required to provide all documentary evidence supporting 
68 Specifically, see ECJ 17 July 1997, C-28/95 Leur Bloem [1997] ECR I-4161, Para. 46 to 48 (in 
particular, Para. 48 let. b) on the need to carry out a general examination and to establish whether there 
is actually tax evasion or avoidance) as regards the anti-abuse clause set by the Merger Directive, and, 
e.g.,  ECJ 16 July 1998, C-264/96 ICI  [1998] ECR I-4695, Para. 26  regarding location-related 
decisions and ECJ 12 December 2002, C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst  [2002] ECR I-11779, Para. 37 as 
regards anti-abuse rules set by national laws. Despite the uncertainties it left, the Marks & Spencer 
ruling  (ECJ 13 December 2005, C-446/03, Marks & Spencer [2005]  ECR I-10837), as it was 
observed, in itself does not refer to the burden of proof:  Lang,  European Taxation 2006, p. 65
69 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP060\doc.en,  CCCTB: possibile elements of 
the sharing mechanism, p. 8-9
70European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 10.
its  claim: it  would seem reasonable that,  should this  evidence be totally or partly 
lacking, a “substantive” tax audit could take place by the date within which a decision 
on the appeal needs to be taken. 
   In the author’s view, the fact that the substantive tax audits initiative would, as a 
general rule, be taken by the principal tax authority71, makes it important to identify 
what could be the exceptions. If the choice whereby the failure to file the consolidate 
tax returns would trigger an estimate by the principal tax authority is maintained, the 
tax  audit  under  consideration  here  can  be  one  of  these  exceptions.  It  would  be 
reasonable  to  provide  that,  in  this  case,  the  audit  could  be  decided  by  the 
administrative body hearing the appeal (rather than by the same principal tax authority 
which opposes the taxpayer in the pending proceeding) and started simultaneously, on 
the  request  of  this  body  forwarded  to  all  tax  authorities  concerned,  by  each  tax 
authorities in the Member States where the group has its consolidated units, which 
would need to bear the obligation under the CCCTB Directive to inform each others 
of the start of the audit, of the findings and of the conclusion. In the context of the 
appeal  against  the  assessment  based  on  the  estimate,  this  audit  would  serve, 
ultimately, to corroborate the principal taxpayer’s claim which was at the basis of the 
appeal  against  the  estimate.  On  the  other  hand,  as  proposed  in  5.6,  the  second 
hypothesis – i.e., the failure to respond to other enquiries – could trigger an audit for 
verifying whether misstatements have been made by the taxpayer for wilful act or 
gross  negligence,  in  connection  with  the  extension  of  time  for  issuing  amended 
assessments proposed by the CCCTBWG. 
   Lastly, case 4), i.e. the case of tax returns containing multiple and significant errors 
and  inconsistencies,  could  receive  a  treatment  similar  to  case  3).  In  effect,  some 
Member States already equate the two cases, by providing that if the company either 
fails to file the tax returns or the data contained in the tax returns or records show 
multiple and significant errors to such an extent as to be considered as not reliable, the 
tax  authorities  issue  an  assessment  based  on  an  estimate  according  to  their  best 
knowledge72. Even in case of unreliability of the consolidated tax returns – where, in 
the author’s view, it  would be sufficient that one of the tax authorities concerned 
considers the returns to be unreliable and, if different from the principal tax authority, 
informs  this  latter  accordingly  –  the  principal  tax  authority  could  thus  issue  an 
amendment  based  on  an  estimate,  the principal  taxpayer  could appeal  against  the 
estimate and the substantive audit could be decided again by the administrative body. 
This case could thus create a second exception to the general role of the principal tax 
authority in taking the substantive tax audits initiative. The reason would be – just like 
case 3) – to guarantee that, pending the proceeding, the audit decision rests on a body 
which has not been involved in the original decision (the issue of the estimate by the 
principal tax authority) against which the taxpayer has appealed.  
     The circumstance that, in the event of failure to file the tax returns (first situation 
in case 3),   the formal  verification phase would lack,  suggests  to  distinguish this 
hypothesis from the remaining ones in which both phases would be possible, and to 
propose the procedural rules for these other cases.  
71 Which appears to reflect the current orientations which emerged at the Conference: retro, par. II.  
72 As recalled in European Commission, 19 May 2006, CCCTB\WP\036\doc\en, Points for discussion 
on ‘Administrative and Legal Framework’, 19 May 2006, p. 7.  
5.3. Hypothesis for procedural rules concerning the “formal verification” and the 
remaining cases for “substantive tax audits” suggested for inclusion in the CCCTB 
legislation. 
   Although the latest working document73 does not express an opinion on whether 
Directive 77/799/EC is the right legal tool for the necessary communication between 
the principal tax authority and other tax authorities concerned, two observations could 
be  formulated.  First,  the  exchange  of  information  provisions  contained  in  DTCs 
between Member States could no longer be relevant for companies opting for the 
CCCTB if the recent suggestion74 of “freezing” these DTCs for such companies was 
accepted.  In turn, this suggestion appears to be certainly reasonable, in light of the 
need  for  effective  communication  between  the  tax  administrations  involved  in 
administering not their own internal tax base regimes, but an EC law tax base which 
was not even considered at the time of negotiations of the (exchange of information 
provisions of) DTCs. In other words, the administration of a new EC law tax base 
should rely on uniform EC law provisions concerning the necessary communication 
between the principal tax authority and other tax authorities for this purpose. Second, 
and as a result, this communication  could fall within the categories of exchange of  
information on request, of automatic exchange and of spontaneous exchange which 
are already indicated by Directive 77/799/EEC (concerning mutual assistance by the 
competent authorities of the Member State in the field of direct taxation), irrespective 
of whether the new provisions will amend Directive 77/799/EEC in this respect, to 
include reference to the CCCTB, or whether they will be designed to be self-sufficient 
and included exclusively in the CCCTB Directive. This latter may be indeed the most 
appropriate option, as tools such as the central data base and the initial notice to opt 
for  the new regime,  which are  complementary to  the communication that  will  be 
necessary throughout the audit procedure, go much beyond what was contemplated at 
the time of introduction of Directive 77/799/EEC.   
    However, in the author’s view the key choices to be made for devising an efficient  
working of the audit procedure would be which information should fall within each of  
the three cases of exchange on request, of automatic and of spontaneous exchange.
    Because  the  consolidated  tax  returns  and  supporting  documents  filed  to  the 
principal tax authority – which supporting documents, by assumption, would consist 
of the balance sheets, profits and loss accounts and accompanying reports by directors 
and  auditors  –  would  be  stored  on  the  central  database  to  which  all  other  tax 
authorities would have access, neither these consolidated returns nor the supporting 
documents would need to fall within the transmission of information. After the receipt 
of the consolidated tax return and their supporting documents (to be submitted by the 
principal taxpayer within 9 months of the end of the tax year)75,  the principal tax 
authority could have the responsibility for filing them into the central database, and 
for  informing  each  year  the  other  tax  authorities  of  the  submission  and  of  the 
availability of the documentation in the central database. This information76 would, in 
other words, fall within the category of “automatic” (regular) exchanges. The CCCTB 
73 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 10. 
74 Formulated by Prof. Pasquale Pistone during the Conference. 
75 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 8
76 Which  could include a reference number to identify the group and be followed by an 
acknowledgment of receipt by the receiving tax authority.
Directive could either impose directly an obligation to this effect, or amend Art. 3 of 
Directive 77/799 to include specifically the exchange of information concerning the 
notice of submission of consolidated tax returns with supporting documents by the 
principal tax authority (and of the acknowledgment of receipt by the other competent 
tax  authorities)  in  the  case  of  groups  opting  for  the  CCCTB within  the  cases  of 
automatic exchange of information. 
   Whereas the formal verification of the consolidated tax return by the principal tax 
authority  would  be  a  necessary  phase,  and  in  this  sense  could  be  intended  as  a 
“primary” responsibility of this tax authority, whether or not the other competent tax 
authorities could play a role during this verification could depend again on the scope 
of the CCCTB Directive and on the contents of the consolidated tax return that these 
other tax authorities would be able to access in the database. In this regard, it must be 
recalled  that  the  CCCTB  Directive  would  define  the  tax  base  itself  but  not  the 
methodology for  adjusting  the  individual  company’s  accounts  to  arrive  at  the  tax 
base77, while at the same time the consolidated tax returns would show the “details of 
the calculation of the consolidated tax base of the company or group”. If accepting 
that, in showing the “details” of this calculation, the consolidated tax return would 
show the adjustments made to individual company accounts to arrive at the tax base 
(which would mean to show the calculation made to arrive at the tax profit or tax loss 
before the consolidation and then to arrive at the consolidated tax base), and if these 
adjustments would remain outside the scope of the Directive and regulated by national 
laws, the other competent tax authorities, by accessing the consolidated tax returns 
and the supporting documentation, would be able to check whether the methodology 
for adjusting the accounts of companies located in their own jurisdictions has been 
correctly applied. Should they find that this is not the case, these tax authorities would 
be in a position to inform the principal tax authority of any mistake made in the 
adjustments  as  well  as  of  any  implication  in  terms  of  under-calculation  of  the 
individual tax base of the company concerned, and thus of the consolidated tax base 
of the group and of the share of each consolidated entity in each State. Accordingly, it 
would  appear  logical  to  require,  at  this  stage,  a  “spontaneous  exchange  of 
information” within the meaning intended by Art. 4 of Directive 77/799, i.e. to require 
the  tax  authority  concerned  (who  realises  that  the  methodology  for  adjusting  the 
individual accounts of a consolidated company resident in its jurisdictions has not 
been properly applied, resulting eventually in an under-calculation of the consolidated 
tax base and of the share of each State) to forward the information at issue, without 
prior request, to the principal tax authority and to all other concerned tax authorities. 
This is because, in the case under consideration, the tax authority concerned would 
have “grounds for supposing that there may be a loss of tax in the other Member 
State” 78  (more precisely, in all other Member States where the group operates). For 
the smooth functioning of the system, it could be appropriate to set a deadline by 
which this tax authority should spontaneously send the information to the principal 
tax authority and to all other competent tax authorities. The principal tax authority, 
after receiving the information (and acknowledging receipt to the authority sending 
it), should use it  in issuing an amended assessment to the principal taxpayer, as a 
conclusive result of the phase of formal verification of the consolidated tax returns. 
77 European Commission, 26 July 2007, CCCTB/WP057\doc\en, CCCTB: possibile elements of a 
technical outline, p. 5
78 Art. 4 (1)(a) of Directive 77/799/EEC. 
Again, after issuing this amended assessment and filing it with the central database, 
the principal tax authority should inform the other competent tax authorities.
   Even outside the case considered, i.e. without the notice of errors in the adjustment 
of an individual company accounts given by the tax authority of the Member State of 
location  of  the  company,  the  principal  tax  authority  should  notify  the  principal 
taxpayer, as well as the other competent tax authorities, that this first phase of the tax 
audits has been carried out, and let them know the outcome (no amended assessment 
on the consolidated tax return), within a specific deadline.      
   Shortly, it is submitted that, during the first (necessary) phase of tax audits - which 
would  consist  of  the  formal  verification  of  the  consolidated  tax  returns  with  the 
necessary involvement of the principal tax authority and the possible involvement of 
other  competent  tax  authorities  –  there  would  always  need  to  be  an  automatic 
exchange of information at the initiative of the principal tax authority, and there may 
be a spontaneous exchange of information at  the initiative of other competent tax 
authorities. An observation can be formulated: as regards case 4) above indicated, i.e. 
the  case  of  multiple  and  significant  errors  and  inconsistencies  that  make  the  tax 
returns unreliable, this would inevitably emerge during the formal verification phase, 
when any tax authority should be allowed to notify the others that it considers the tax 
returns unreliable.  From that  time, the case would however,  with the issue of the 
amended assessment based on an estimate, follow its own route (i.e, possible appeal, 
possible  substantive  audit  at  the  decision  of  the  administrative  body),  so  that  an 
overall procedure will be proposed below with regard to the remaining cases that, by 
assumption, would be set out by the CCCTB Directive. The cases indicated in 5.2. – 
i.e.,  the case of  multiple and significant  errors  (Case 4)  and of  failure  to file  the 
consolidated tax  returns  (Case  3)  –  could  reasonably  be  assumed to  be  bound to 
represent  in the reality  a minority of cases, to the extent that CCCTB taxpayers can 
be expected to entrust their professional tax advisors to carry out all fulfilments on 
their behalf. Accordingly, the exceptions to a general rule of leaving the principal tax 
authority the input for the tax audits initiative introduced by these cases could be 
supposed not to create significant departures from such a general rule, because the 
majority of situations triggering the substantive tax audits according to the criteria set 
by  the  Directive  could  be  expected  to  fall  within  the  remaining  cases.  These 
remaining  cases  corresponding  to  the  criteria  set  by  this  Directive  would  be,  as 
indicated  in  5.2.,  those  of  continuous  losses  or  continuously  decreasing  profits 
declared by a company included in the consolidation if accompanied by inflows of 
financial resources, and of continuous errors in the calculation of the share of a tax 
base.    
    The rules concerning the second (possible) phase of tax audits (“substantive tax 
audits”) should take into consideration both these cases for substantive tax audits and 
the already existing national practices. 
    In  the  situations  falling within these  remaining cases  set  out  by  the  CCCTB 
Directive, the initiative could be taken by the principal tax authority, who should also 
interact with the principal taxpayer, and the decision whether to actually carry out the 
enquiries  and  inspections  of  the  company’s  books,  administrative  documents  and 
premises  could  be  jointly  taken.  This  in  order  to  reconcile  the  adoption,  to  the 
maximum possible extent, of the “one stop shop” approach (which is important for the 
efficient  functioning  of  the system in  allowing taxpayers  to  interact  with one tax 
authority only)  with the participation by all concerned tax authorities. On the other 
hand, as it was previously argued, one of the reasons for indicating in the Directive 
the  criteria  for  selecting  taxpayers  for  substantive  tax  audits  consists  of  creating 
common rules for tax authorities which have to adopt a “team working” approach79: 
should therefore the principal tax authority, in a situation that may trigger substantive 
tax audits under the Directive, omit to take the initiative, the other competent tax 
authorities would have grounds for requiring it to do so, which would apply towards 
companies located in any of the jurisdictions concerned (i.e., both to the principal 
taxpayers and to any other consolidated company).   
   As regards the initiative and the various steps, a typical procedure through which 
the  principal  tax  authority  takes  the  initiative  regarding  consolidated  companies 
resident in other jurisdictions may be as follows.
   The principal tax authority – after noting, thanks to the information contained in the 
consolidated tax returns and in the accompanying documents, that one (or both) of the 
two anomalous cases (corresponding to the criteria set  by the Directive) occurs – 
could ask the tax authority of the jurisdiction of location of the company concerned 
to forward any information and related documentation which cannot be found in the 
documents accompanying the tax returns and which may explain the situation. 
   Again, as it was noted above, in 5., the information that the requested tax authority 
could  forward  would  not  include  commercial,  business,  industrial  or  professional 
secrets  properly  understood,  but  would  be  limited  to  those  details  concerning 
transactions entered into by the company or in any case illustrating the company’s 
trends in the market, i.e. to those details from which the actual economic and financial 
situation as relevant for tax purposes can be inferred.
   The tax authority receiving the request may have the information due to its previous 
contacts  with the  company (i.e.,  due to  its  contacts  with  the  company before the 
option for the CCCTB regime and the inclusion in the consolidated group) or may be 
in a position to easily get the information and the related documents under national 
laws  (e.g.,  the  financial  situation  as  indicated  by  bank  accounts;  the  number  of 
employees in the payroll as registered with social security institutions etc..). In other 
words, a preliminary stage of  substantive tax audits could start with an “exchange on 
request”  ,   where,  however,  the  authority  of  the  requested  State,  unlike  the  case 
indicated by the second indent of Art. 2(1) of Directive 77/799/EEC, would always 
need to comply with the request, because the principal tax authority would have, by 
definition, exhausted its own usual source of information (the consolidated tax returns 
and  the  accompanying  documents  transmitted  by  the  principal  taxpayer).  The  tax 
authority of the requested State could comply with the request  either  by forwarding 
the information and related documents if required  or by responding that it does not 
have proper information which may explain the situation. In order for the principal 
taxpayer to be kept updated with the tax audit initiatives concerning the consolidated 
group  on  the  whole  and  to  interact  with  the  principal  tax  authority  since  the 
preliminary stage,  the principal  tax authority should inform the principal  taxpayer 
about the request made to the competent tax authority and about the response, and 
expressly give the principal taxpayer the possibility to forward whatever information 
it considers to be useful for the purpose within a deadline. The principal taxpayer 
could in this way obtain from the consolidated company at issue, and forward to the 
principal tax authority, even any information that the competent tax authority may not 
possess  and  it  considers  to  be  useful  for  explaining  the  situation.  Whether  the 
information provided by the principal taxpayer ought to be considered as satisfactory 
should be a matter for joint decision by the two tax authorities, who may thus decide 
by  common  agreement  not  to  go  on  with  further  enquiries,  investigations  and 
inspections of the company’s premises and documents.  
79 Retro, 5.1.
    In the case that either the information forwarded by the competent tax authority 
does not justify the situation at stake or this tax administration does have no useful 
information and the principal taxpayer does not forward any (useful) detail or has not 
forwarded, in the opinion of either of the tax authorities concerned, any satisfactory 
detail,  the principal tax authority, together with the competent tax authority, would 
decide  the substantive tax  audits  and  establish,  together  with this  latter  authority, 
which enquires, inspections and investigations would be necessary. The audit would 
be carried out by the local tax authority, which would proceed to the inspection of the 
company’s  books,  documents,  premises  etc…according  to  the  procedural 
requirements  of  national  law80.   The  decision  to  carry  out  the  inspections  and 
investigations, as well as the target of inspections and investigations, could thus be a 
decision jointly taken by the principal tax authority and the local tax authority, on the 
proposal of either the former or the latter (and, in any case, after the first input – i.e., 
the request for information – by the principal tax authority). 
   It was suggested in a working document that there should be agreement on some 
elements of the audit  procedure, e.g. “a common maximum length of the audit  or 
common statute  of  limitation”81  which would decrease the scope of tax planning 
aimed at choosing the administration with the most generous procedural rules, and 
that a common statute of limitation “is particularly important for tax administrations 
in order to avoid being blocked by too generous legislation”  82 in one participating 
jurisdiction (where the author would intend “common statute of limitation”, in this 
context, as meaning “common statute of limitation” to the powers of inspectors)83. 
Undoubtedly, a provision of the Directive establishing a common maximum duration 
of the substantive audit, i.e. how long inspections on company’s books and premises 
could  last,  and  some  common  obligations  to  be  complied  with  by  inspectors  in 
carrying out the audit  – such as, e.g.,  an obligation to minimise any disruption to the 
activity carried out in the company’s offices and premises – would go in the direction 
indicated in the working documents. However, two observations can be made. First, 
just  like  the  limitations  in  terms  of  tax  years  covered  by  the  audit84,  a  common 
maximum duration of a substantive audit or common obligations on inspectors would 
need  to  cover  the  inspections  intended  to  verify  both  the  compliance  with  the 
Directive provisions and the compliance with national provisions which are deemed 
to be essential in arriving at the correct determination of the tax base as identified by 
the Directive. Second, other features of the inspections, such as which documents can 
be examined and/or in which order, would inevitably need to remain governed by 
national  laws,  unless  and  until  a  complete  harmonisation (not  only of  accounting 
principles but also) of all kinds of administrative documentation, such as the main 
books, the auxiliary books and the individual supporting documents, took place. 
   Nonetheless, the target of inspections and investigations could be jointly decided in 
the sense that the aspect(s) of relevance in the concrete case should be agreed by the 
principal  tax  authority  and the  local  tax  authority.  E.g.,  in  case  of  a  would-seem 
under-declaration of the share of a company in a Member State for more than one 
year on the base of data provided in the consolidated tax returns and in supporting 
documents, the aspect of relevance would lie in the correct application of the sharing 
80 European  Commission,  19  May  2006,  CCCTB\WP\036\doc\en,  Points  for  discussion  on 
‘Administrative and Legal Framework’, 19 May 2006, p. 7. 
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 About a common time limitation, retro, par. IV.
84 Retro, par. III and par. IV, 4. and 4.1. 
mechanism, and this target could be proposed by either the principal tax authority or 
the local tax authority concerned (even if one of the two administrations considered 
the information provided by the principal taxpayer to be acceptable, this tax authority 
would have no interest in opposing a proposal of the other tax authority to carry out 
the inspections; the two authorities could, in this case, decide to limit the audit to 
certain investigations). The audit would then be carried out by the local tax authority, 
who  should  inform,  without  prior  request,  the  principal  tax  authority  and  the 
competent  tax authorities  in  the other countries where the group has  consolidated 
subsidiaries of the outcome of the audit.  
  This would be, again, a “spontaneous” exchange of information falling within the 
category of Art. 4(1)(e) of Directive 77/799: the information could in fact indicate, as 
a  conclusive  finding  of  the  audit,  that  either  the  contribution  of  the  consolidated 
company  at  stake  to  the  group’s  taxable  base  was  correctly  determined  in  the 
consolidated tax return or that a re-assessment needs to be made. In both cases, there 
would  be  an  effect  on  the  amount  of  the  consolidated  tax  base,  which  may  be 
increased as a result of the re-assessment, and thus on the amount of the share of each 
other involved State too.  
       
5.4. Hypothesis for procedural rules concerning the event of “substantive tax audits” 
carried out in accordance with national practices.
      The tax authority of a Member State of location of a consolidated company may 
have – in accordance with its national legislation, guidelines or practices - reasons for 
carrying out a substantive tax audit of this company, which would not be carried out if 
this company were located in the jurisdiction of the principal tax authority.  E.g., as it 
was recalled, some Member States have calculated a minimum income for certain 
categories of individual and corporate taxpayers, based on average income of business 
operating in a specific economic sector or other statistical tools, and expect taxpayers 
to submit a tax return indicating at least such a minimum taxable income85: a situation 
may thus occur where the Member State of the principal tax authority does not expect 
its  resident  corporate  taxpayers  to  indicate  a  minimum  taxable  income,  but  the 
Member State of residence of one of the consolidated companies does so, and where 
the tax authority of the latter Member State, by accessing the consolidated tax returns 
in the database, realises that the consolidated company resident in its jurisdiction has 
not  indicated  such  minimum  income  in  determining  its  taxable  profit  before 
consolidation.  In  such  a  situation,   this  latter  tax  authority  could  be  required  or 
allowed  by  its  national  laws  to  proceed  to  enquiries  and  further  inspections  and 
investigations  of  the  company’s  books,  premises,  documents  etc…aimed  at 
ascertaining  whether  the  lower  income  indicated  by  the  company  concerned 
corresponds to the income actually derived: it appears logical to leave the substantive 
tax audits initiatives directly to the tax authority concerned, which would introduce a 
further exception to the general choice of leaving the substantive tax audits initiative 
to the principal tax authority.  The exception would be motivated, in the case here 
considered, by reasons of efficient time management, as the alternative would seem to 
be an initiative taken by the principal tax authority but on a proposal from the tax 
authority concerned (which would thus, in any case, offer the first input). 
    If  these situations  were covered by a  “principle  of  mutual  recognition”,  each 
Member State  where the group has consolidated companies would accept that the 
85 European  Commission,  19  May  2006,  CCCTB\WP\036\doc\en,  Points  for  discussion  on 
‘Administrative and Legal Framework’, 19 May 2006, p. 7; also retro, 5.1.  
consolidated  tax  base,  and  consequently  its  own  share  in  this  tax  base,  could 
ultimately depend on an audits initiative of tax authorities of another Member State 
justified by reasons indicated by the legislation of this latter State and which may 
have no equivalent in its national laws. The local tax authority carrying out the audit 
should again, without request, inform the principal tax authority of the audit initiative 
and of its final outcome. Moreover, the rationale for substantive tax audits already 
envisaged by national laws, by giving the national tax inspectors the occasion to enter 
the  company’s  premises,  checking  the  individual  documents  and  verifying  the 
physical assets used by the company, would give the possibility to audit the proper 
application of the sharing mechanism too, even where the case of under-calculation of 
the tax base share for more than one year does not occur. This possibility appears to 
be important, because in a situation in which the calculation of the share of a company 
in a Member State shown in the consolidated tax return is consistent with the data 
provided  in  the  accompanying  documents,  a  potentially  wrong  application  of  the 
sharing mechanism would not emerge from the formal verification by the principal 
tax authority located in another Member State. Accordingly, any tax authority who, at 
the occasion of an audit carried out on a consolidated company on grounds prescribed 
by national law or in any case in accordance with its national practice, checks the 
elements of the sharing mechanisms and discovers a wrong application which could 
not  have  been  suspected  on  the  sole  basis  of  the  formal  verification  of  the 
consolidated tax returns and supporting documents, should without request inform all 
other tax authorities. 
    Shortly, the audit of the correct application of the sharing mechanism would be 
carried out,  in  the  proposed approach,  either as  a  result  of  a  possible  criteria  for 
substantive audit emerging from the formal verification of consolidated tax returns 
and set out by the new Directive, or as a result of other reasons triggering substantive 
audit  established  by  national  laws  and/or  administrative  guidelines  and  mutually 
recognised by Member States. Member States should be required, in this connection, 
to  regularly  inform  each  others  about  the  changes  in  their  provisions  and/or 
administrative guidelines which establish the strategies and methods for substantive 
audits and which can be used to identify (due to the mutual recognition) the CCCTB 
taxpayers  for  substantive  audits  purposes.  With  a  view  to  maintaining  the 
attractiveness,  in any aspect,  of  the CCCTB regime for taxpayers’  viewpoint,  this 
solution would seem preferable to the an alternative which would consist of a choice 
of making the audit of the sharing mechanism through access to company’s premises 
and inspections possible at any time.        
    Although a principle of mutual recognition of the methods for substantive tax 
audits  already  set  out  by  national  legislations  would  appear  workable  from  the 
viewpoint of national administrations, as none of them could be expected to have an 
interest to oppose an initiative by another tax administration which may result in an 
increase in its own tax revenues, the following question could be raised: given that the 
tax audit initiative by one national authority could affect, even if based on grounds for 
substantive tax audits established by the specific national legislation at issue, the share 
of the overall consolidated tax base and thus that of other Member States too, would 
there  be  the  case  of  a  mutual  recognition as  amongst  the  tax  authorities  of  the 
circumstances  which,  in  a  situation  where  substantive  tax  audits  (thus,  involving 
access to the company’s premises, inspections of books etc..) could be carried out 
under  a  specific  national  legislation,   have  induced  the  national  tax  authority  
concerned to conduct or not to conduct the audit? Assume that one of the national 
legislations concerned provides that substantive tax audits may be carried out if the 
income declared by a company is inferior to a minimum which is regarded as normal 
in the economic sector concerned86, but the national tax authority concerned decides 
not to carry out the audit in the specific case. These situations inevitably reflect the 
different degree of greater or lower trust and cooperation that, in the different Member 
States, exists as between tax administrations and taxpayers, as well as the specific 
relationships  between  the  tax  authority  and  different  taxpayers  within  a  single 
Member State (e.g., a taxpayer who has, in past years, always regularly honoured tax 
declarations and payments obligations might be less subject to substantive audits, by 
the national tax administration, than a taxpayer who has breached these obligations 
and incurred penalties, even if for the same tax year substantive tax audits could be in 
principle  carried  out,  according  to  national  legislations,  guidelines  or  practices, 
towards both taxpayers). 
   In this  author’s view, to foster  mutual transparency between all  tax authorities 
concerned, each tax authority should not only be made fully aware of all cases when, 
under the national  laws of another  Member State,  substantive tax audits  could be 
carried out, but should also know whether or not the substantive tax audit has been or 
will be actually carried out by the tax authority concerned. For this purpose, it appears 
reasonable to suggest that the central database should store not only the consolidated 
tax returns and the consolidated and annual accounts, but also all  data concerning 
consolidated companies which serve to show any situations where, under the national 
tax law and practice of any Member State, there would be reasons for conducting 
substantive tax audits. Because the tax records concerning all consolidated companies, 
including those concerning the audits  and their  outcomes,  would be stored in  the 
central  database,  each  national  tax  authority  of  a  jurisdiction  where  one  of  the 
companies  included in  the consolidation is  located,  and  who realises  that  the  tax 
authority  of  another  Member  State  where  another  company included in  the  same 
consolidated group is located has not carried out or does not conduct a substantive 
audit in a situation where it could have done or do so under the national provisions of 
this second Member State, could require the latter tax authority an explanation of the 
reasons why the audit has not or is not being carried out. The Directive should provide 
for an obligation, upon the tax authority who receives the request, to explain these 
reasons, and, in the absence of a detailed explanation, should entitle the requesting 
authority to obtain, from the other authority, that the substantive tax audits be carried 
out. This solution would appear to be able to strike a balance between on the one hand 
the maintaining of the discretion for any national tax authority to decide whether to 
conduct  a  substantive  tax  audit  whenever  under  its  national  provisions may  be 
allowed to  do so,   and,  on the other  hand,  the need for  transparency as  amongst 
national tax authorities, because the decision whether to carry out an audit taken by 
any tax authority could have effects for all Member States in which the consolidated 
groups operates.             
   Conclusively, it could thus be suggested that a mutual recognition of the national 
regimes governing substantive tax audits and, in this regard, the related obligation on 
Member States to keep each other informed about the changes in their provisions, 
should be accompanied by a “mutual recognition” of the circumstances which have 
induced any tax administration to carry out or not to carry out the tax audit when 
allowed (but not mandatorily required) to do so by its national legislation, provided 
there be an detailed explanation of the underlying choice.      
86 Such is the case, e.g., in Italy, according to the “sector studies” methodology - mentioned retro, 5.1. - 
where the relevant provisions empower, but not oblige, the tax authority to conduct the substantive tax 
audit. 
   
5.5.  Available time for the issue of  amended assessments and available time for tax  
audits.
   The overall structure of tax audit above considered would need to be consistent with 
the  choice  according  to  which  the  principal  tax  authority  could  issue  amended 
assessments, in any event, no later than 3 years after the final date for filing of the 
consolidated return87. This implies that the “substantive” audit phase, when carried 
out, must also be concluded within 3 years from that date, and requires that a much 
shorter deadline, e.g., within one year, be established for the conclusion of the “formal 
verification”88 (the  results  of  which,  as  above  highlighted,  could  trigger  the 
substantive tax audits), to leave the necessary period during which the carrying out of 
the substantive tax audit may take place. The fact that “amended assessments could 
include one or more adjustments to the consolidated tax returns and would normally 
be issued no more than once every 12 months”  89would thus be consistent with a 
provision requiring the formal verification phase (which may result in an amended 
assessment) to be concluded, annually, within 12 month of the deadline for filing the 
tax return. 
    The time limits for the conclusion of the tax audits and for the issue of amended 
assessment as a result of these audits would also need to be consistent with the time 
limitations  concerning the tax years  which could be  subject  to  audit.  Taking into 
consideration the choice to set a 9 months deadline, after the end of the tax year, for 
the filing of the consolidated tax return, and to set, as a normal period, 3 years after 
the final date for filing of the consolidated tax returns for issuing a re-assessment, 
which could follow from the result of the audit,  tax period 1, whose declaration has to 
be  presented  within  9  month  and  thus  during  tax  period  2,  could  be  subject  to 
(substantive)  audit  until  the  end of  the ninth month during tax year  5  (included). 
Consequently, it would be coherent to establish, as a common rule concerning which 
tax years could be audited90, that, during any tax year, tax authorities can audit up to 
the forth previous tax year. A provision to this effect would help the clarity of the 
legislation and avoid interpretative doubts.
     
5.6.  Extension  in  time  for  the  issue  of  amended  assessments  in  exceptional  
circumstances  and substantive tax audits
   In the light of this, the choice whereby “.amended assessment could exceptionally 
be issued after expiry of the 3 year period where a misstatement resulting from a 
wilful act or gross negligence on the part of the taxpayer is discovered within 6 years 
of the final date for filing the consolidated return. The 6 year period for discovery of 
87 Except for particular circumstances: European Commission, 13 November 2007, 
CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of the administrative framework, p. 9 and 10.
88 Which would consist  of a verification of the correctness of the calculation made by the principal 
taxpayer to determine the consolidated tax base shown in the consolidated tax return, and of a cross-
checking between the consolidated tax returns and the supporting documentation forwarded by the 
principal taxpayer. 
89 European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 11
90 Which rule should cover the audit carried out to verify compliance with the provisions of tbe 
Directive as well as compliance with the national provisions concerning the methodology for arriving 
at the common tax base: retro 2 and 3. 
the misstatement would be extended to 12 years where the misstatement is the subject 
of criminal proceedings”91 would need to be, according to this author, completed by a 
provision  specifying  that  the  3rd  year  of  the  final  date  for  consolidated  return 
submission could always be considered as the normal, but not as the absolute, time 
available for substantive audits. 
    In other words, it  appears reasonable to provide that,  in exceptional situations 
justifying a suspect of misstatements due to wilful act or gross negligence - which 
could be  the  case  where this  suspect  derives  from information known by the tax 
authority (in addition to the case of criminal proceedings) due to contacts with other 
sectors of the national administrative system and/or with financial institutions and/or 
through the media where the information is  well  documented -   the principal  tax 
authority and the other concerned tax authorities could send to the principal taxpayer, 
who should be required to give notice to all other members of the consolidated group, 
enquiries asking for information additional to those provided in the consolidated tax 
returns and in the supporting documents. In this regard, it  could be provided that, 
should the principal taxpayer fail to respond to these enquiries92,  a substantive tax 
audit would be simultaneously carried out on all members of the consolidated group, 
for  the  purpose  of  finding  out  whether  there  have  actually  been  misstatements 
resulting from a wilful act or gross negligence on the part of this taxpayer and/or of 
any consolidated company, and that the time available to carry out the audit would be 
extended beyond the 3 years. Again, each tax authority would need to be required to 
inform each others of the start of the audit, of the findings and of the conclusion.  
      
5.7. Errors discovered by the taxpayers and time available for substantive tax audits. 
    A further issue on which a detailed choice would appear to be necessary is the 
treatment of principal taxpayers who, after the filing of the consolidated tax returns in 
due date, realise that the returns contained errors,  deriving e.g.  from errors in the 
books,  and notify the principal tax authority accordingly.   This hypothesis  should 
refer to errors which could not make the consolidated tax returns unreliable on the 
whole, and which might not be discovered first by the tax authorities,  and should thus 
be distinguished from the case of multiple and significant errors and inconsistencies 
making the tax returns unreliable that would become immediately evident to the tax 
authorities and that would fall in case 4) indicated in 5.1. and 5.2. above. 
    The idea that “If the principal taxpayer discovers that the consolidated tax return 
was inaccurate, it would notify the principal tax authority of the error. The principal 
tax authority would, where appropriate, issue an amended assessment in accordance 
with the procedure below”93  (which evidently refers to the discovery of errors by the 
taxpayer before the issue of the amended assessment by the tax authority) leaves open 
any solution as regards: whether the principal taxpayer who discovers the error would 
be required to notify the tax authority or whether would be simply permitted to do so 
as a form of “spontaneous correction” to its own benefit (e.g., for avoiding totally or 
partly  the  fines  that  could  be  associated  with  a  re-assessment  by  the  tax 
administration),  in  which  latter  case  it  can  be  assumed  that  it  would  notify  the 
91  European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework, p. 10
92 Due to either its own negligence or will or to the negligence or will of another member of the 
consolidated group to which the suspect refers.
93  European Commission, 13 November 2007, CCCTB/WP061\doc\en, CCCTB: possible elements of 
the administrative framework,  p. 10.
principal tax authority; when it would be appropriate for the principal tax authority to 
issue an amended assessment; if there would be any consequence for the tax audits. 
     In the working document, the case where the principal tax authority issues an 
amended assessment as a result of the notification by the principal taxpayer of errors 
that this latter has discovered is equated with the case where the principal taxpayer 
has failed to file the consolidated tax return by the due date (“..in accordance with the 
procedure below”) 94,  i.e. the amended assessment, issued by an administrative act, 
would be based on an estimate, taking the available information into account, against 
which the principal taxpayer could appeal. 
     In light of the need to make the CCCTB regime (not only attractive for corporate 
taxpayers  but  also)  as  simple  as  possible  to  administer,  and  to  encourage  a 
collaborative relationship between taxpayers and tax administrations, it seems to be 
appropriate to avoid a situation where taxpayers who (in good faith) realise that they 
have made unintentional errors, and who thus allow the tax authority to become aware 
of the error, are more likely to be subject to re-assessment than taxpayers who may 
have willingly tried to escape the regular fulfilment of tax obligations, and who may 
have tried to do so e.g., by failing to file the return by the due date, by accepting the 
possibility of estimate by the tax administration and by renouncing the appeal against 
the assessment based on the estimate in case that this estimate leads to a lower taxable 
profit than the one actually gained (and that the tax burden deriving from the estimate, 
together with the cost of any penalty for failure to file the tax return, is lower than the 
tax burden corresponding to a proper determination of the taxable base).  For this 
reason, the preferable option would seem to be that of giving taxpayers who discover 
errors  the  possibility  of   “spontaneous  correction”,   and  of  drawing  a  distinction 
according to the consequences of the error discovered by the taxpayer and of the 
necessary  correction:  if  the  error  notified  by  the  taxpayer,  and  the  consequent 
correction made by the taxpayer himself in either the notification or a subsequent tax 
return intended to rectify the first one, leads to an higher amount of the taxable base, a 
presumption  of  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the  taxpayer  would  seem  to  be  well 
grounded. In such case, it appears reasonable to establish that the tax authority should 
not issue an amended assessment, whereas the issue of an amended assessment based 
on an estimate should remain possible in the opposite case, i.e. if the result of the 
correction of the error led to a lower amount of the taxable base. Moreover, in this 
latter case, the time limit for audits could start from the notification by the taxpayer or 
from the issue of the amended assessment, whereas, in the former case (correction to 
the benefit of tax revenues), it could remain linked to the deadline for the submission 
of the consolidated tax return (already) filed by the taxpayer.   While keeping the 
auditing  powers,  this  distinction  in  the  time  limit95 could  thus  avoid  creating 
disadvantages for taxpayers who signal unintentional errors, in good faith and to the 
benefit of the tax revenues. In addition, as a measure to encourage this behaviour, the 
non application of penalties and tax surcharges should be considered.        
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
    In  summary,  as  responses  to  the  questions  which  were  raised  for  discussion 
concerning the tax audits, it has been basically argued in this work that: 
94 Ibid, p. 10.
95 Not envisaged by the CCCTBWG.
a) the common time limitation for tax audits should cover the compliance with 
all  provisions  (including  the  ones  left  to  national  laws)  concerning  the 
determination of the tax base; 
b) in the relations with third countries, a mutual recognition of the time limits 
could operate, at least in the short term; 
c) the Directive should specify, with clear and precise provisions, the objective 
criteria  for  selecting  the  CCCTB  taxpayers  towards  whom  to  carry  out 
“substantive  tax  audits”  (consisting  of  further  enquiries,  investigations, 
inspections  of  the  company’s  books,  premises),  i.e.  the  grounds  for  these 
audits, and not limit itself to provide for a mutual recognition of the national 
regimes in this respect; 
d) the transmission of information throughout the audit procedure could be based 
on  the  categories  of  automatic,  spontaneous  and  requested  exchanges 
introduced by Directive 77/799/EEC, except that it should not be possible for 
a  national  tax  authority  to  refuse  to  comply  with  the  request  of  another 
national tax authority; 
e) the substantive tax audits could receive the “first input” from the principal tax 
authority  in  the  majority  of  situations  falling  under  the  criteria  set  by  the 
Directive, with exceptions which may be expected not to occur frequently (i.e. 
the cases of request from the body handling the appeal against an amended 
assessment based on an estimate), or, during the initial period of application of 
the CCCTB, these  audits  could receive such input  from other  national  tax 
authorities by virtue of the mutual recognition of existing national practices 
during such period; 
f) the  national  tax  authorities  should  keep  each  others  informed  about  the 
evolution of  national  provisions  concerning  the  strategies  and methods for 
substantive tax audits; 
g) the  “mutual  recognition”  should  extend  to  the  circumstances  which  have 
induced a tax authority to conduct or not to conduct the audit in situations 
where  it  would  be allowed to  do so by  its  national  legislations,  if  clearly 
explained  to  other  tax  authorities  and,  without  this  explanation,  the  tax 
authority of another Member State should be entitled to require the audit; 
h) the kind of supporting documents which, together with the consolidated tax 
returns, should be stored in the central database would have a key importance 
for the working of the system; 
i) last, the taxpayers who signal unintentional errors that the tax authority may 
not discover first  should receive a better treatment than the taxpayers who do 
not do so, for audit purposes too. 
Another feature mentioned in the working documents, a common length of the audit, 
would undoubtedly be desirable.
  The most controversial aspect amongst the proposed solutions may perhaps be the 
suggestion that the criteria for selecting CCCTB taxpayers for substantive tax audits 
purposes should be clearly specified in the Directive, and that these criteria should 
only lie, at least for the initial period of application of the CCCTB, in those above 
identified  in  V,  5.1.  and  5.2..  It  might  perhaps  be  objected  that,  since  –  as  the 
Commission reminded96 –  the ECJ has stated that direct taxation does not fall as such 
within the purview of the Community, any provisions empowering tax authorities to 
carry on substantive tax audits – and the related strategies and methods - should be 
96 EC Law and Tax Treaties, working document, 9 June 2005 (Ref.: TAXUD E1/FR DOC (05) 2306) 
for the Worshop of Experts on 5 July 2005, p. 3.  
still left to national laws as some of the key provisions concerning direct taxation as 
such, and that the Directive should limit itself to a mutual recognition. Nonetheless, 
the  response  to  this  objection  could  be  that,  unlike  the  ECJ  rulings  which   -  by 
removing national provisions to the extent that they create tax barriers to the proper 
functioning  of  the  internal  market  –  generate  a  “negative”  integration,  the  new 
Directive needs to provide a system for “positive” integration in which some of the 
most important tax provisions, such as those setting out the criteria for substantive tax 
audits, become part of the provisions that need to be introduced (and incorporated in 
the Directive issued under Art. 94 of the Treaty) for the proper functioning of the 
internal market. In effect, without these uniform provisions setting out the grounds for 
substantive tax audit, forum-shopping phenomenon, under the forms of groups unit 
location  decisions,  aimed  at  artificially  circumventing  those  national  provisions 
leaving the widest scope for substantive tax audits, would end up being encouraged 
(which would increase the risk of distortions ). From this viewpoint, it may even be 
argued that an introduction of uniform criteria for substantive tax audits by a clear 
provision in the Directive coupled with a mutual recognition of the national criteria, 
guidelines and practices (which, in this work, has been proposed for the first period of 
the  CCCTB  regime),  would  actually  be  the  “second-best”  solution,  that  may  be 
(politically) acceptable to Member States in the current stage where they still try to 
safeguard their autonomy in shaping the national tax provisions including those on 
substantive tax audits. This because the “first-best” solution would be, for all eligible 
taxpayers opting for the CCCTB as consolidated groups, the be subject to substantive 
tax audits  only in  accordance with the possible criteria  specified by the Directive 
irrespective of the Member State of residence of the principal taxpayers and of other 
group’s units. It would seem to the author that this optimal choice – which would 
obviously  enhance  the  role  of  the  principal  tax  authority  as  a  “captain”  of  the 
“auditing team” -  might realistically be proposed only in the medium or longer term, 
i.e.  after  the end of the initial  period (e.g.  5 years or more) of application of the 
CCCTB, since, by that time, the experience gained by tax authorities in cooperating 
with each others may eventually help them to perceive the advantages of common 
criteria to deal with common concerns. Such a choice could then be implemented by 
adding  in  the  Directive  other  criteria  for  selecting  the  CCCTB  taxpayers  for 
substantive tax audits (such as e.g.  the tax compliance – related conduct of these 
taxpayers  during  the first  years  of  application of  the  CCCTB or  economic sector 
related-methodologies), which should replace the national strategies and methods due 
to the recognition of their ability to achieve the same, ultimate goal of allowing an 
efficient and effective management of the risks of tax evasion and avoidance.  
      In addition to enhancing legal certainty for consolidated groups wherever their 
units are located, and to helping the overall simplicity of the system, this choice, after 
creating two parallel sets of provisions concerning the grounds for substantive tax 
audits  –  the  EC  provisions  applicable  only  to  companies  eligible  to  opt  for  the 
CCCTB  as  consolidated  groups,  and  the  national  provisions  applicable  only  to 
companies ineligible to this option – may well generate a market-driven convergence 
towards the CCCTB provisions if national legislators wish their own systems to be 
competitive in all more important aspects with the new one.  The CCCTB legislation, 
including  its  (in  the  author’s  view)  most  important  aspect  with  regard  to  the  tax 
audits, would - in producing this effect – become a true vehicle for “tax integration” 
(rather  than  unintentionally  contributing  to  the  risk  of  “tax  disintegration”), 
consistently with its ultimate purpose.  
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